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The Sins of Innocence in
Standing Doctrine
Elise C. Boddie*
Should reverse discrimination plaintiffs always be able to challenge
race-conscious selection policies in court? Conventional standing doctrine
requires plaintiffs to show that the contested policy or practice has caused a
concrete, personal harm. Yet in affirmative action cases, courts seem to have
quietly dispensed with this requiredshowing. The Supreme Court's decision in
Fisher v. University of Texas is a prime example. The university illustrated
that the white plaintiff would not have been admitted whatever her race. Yet
the Court completely ignored the standing inquiry, reinforcing the significant
confusion among courts and scholars alike about the cognizability of racial
injury. Some scholars attribute these relaxed standing outcomes to inherent
expressive or stigmatic harms associated with racial classifications. This
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Article contends that a more complex dynamic is at work. It identifies and
critiques an "innocence paradigm" that presumes harm to white plaintiffs
from affirmative action. Legal scholars have long criticized the instability of
standing doctrine, but none has fully explored the role that racialized
conceptions of innocence plays in structuring standing analysis. This Article
fills that gap. It defines the elements of the innocence paradigm in equal
protection and discusses its role as an agent of racial injury in affirmative
action litigation. It then explains how innocence shifted from equal protection
to the proceduralrealm of standing, enabling anti-affirmativeaction litigants
to access federal courts in the absence of any concrete, personal harm. By
demonstrating the substantive and procedural operation of the innocence
paradigm, the Article highlights the role that standing doctrine plays as both
an instrument and product of racial inequality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When should white plaintiffs be able to challenge raceconscious selection policies? The answer is a mystery. Conventional
standing doctrine requires plaintiffs to show that the contested policy
or practice has caused a concrete, personal harm.1 Yet, in affirmative
action cases, courts appear to have quietly dispensed with this
required showing. The Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin 2 is the most recent example. The white
plaintiff, Abigail Fisher, challenged the constitutionality of the
University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions policy. 3 The
university illustrated that it would have rejected Fisher from its
freshman class regardless of her race. 4 Thus, Fisher's standing should
have been a live question. And yet the Court simply ignored it.5
Remarkably, it sent the case back to the lower court to reapply the
constitutional standard without any mention, much less analysis, of
Fisher's supposed injury.6 This result was particularly notable given
that, in two other critically important cases also decided that term,
the Court tossed plaintiffs for failing to demonstrate that they had a
sufficient stake in the outcome of a contested government policy.' The
Court reminded the litigants that simply having a "keen interest" in
an outcome was not enough.8 The "overriding and time-honored
concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper
constitutional sphere" demanded that the Court resist the "natural
urge" to resolve public debates simply for the "sake of convenience and
efficiency." 9

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
1.
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2.
Id. at 2415.
3.
See infra Part II.B.
4.
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411.
5.
See id. at 2422; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (holding
6.
that petitioners lacked standing and therefore declining to address their alleged injury). The
Court "bear[s] an independent obligation to assure [itself] that jurisdiction is proper before
proceeding to the merits" of the case. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554
U.S. 316, 324 (2008).
7.
See Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (rebuffing proponents of California ballot initiative that
denied same-sex couples the ability to marry after state officials declined to appeal a ruling
striking down the initiative); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin government surveillance under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act due to an insufficient certainty that they would be harmed
in the future by the statute's operation).
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.
8.
9.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)).
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Scholars have long criticized the incoherence of standing
doctrine,10 and it therefore comes as no surprise that cases challenging
race-conscious selection policies suffer from the same contradictions.11
So why another article about standing? As this Article makes clear,
the troubles of standing doctrine are magnified when they intersect
with race for two reasons.1 2 First, the favored status of white litigants
challenging affirmative action threatens basic constitutional
commands of racial impartiality in our federal justice system.1 3 If the
inconsistencies in standing doctrine undermine our faith in the logic of
federal jurisdiction, then racial disparities in the doctrine undermine
our faith in the courts themselves as racially neutral arbiters of the
law.
The second reason is the primary focus for this Article. In the
context of affirmative action, standing has served as both an agent

10.
See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591,
591 (2010) (observing that "standing doctrine is one of the most widely theorized and criticized
doctrines in U.S. law"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2002) ("Injury determinations have been marked by a
breathtaking inconsistency."); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73,
86-103 (2007) (discussing flawed premises of standing doctrine); Girardeau A. Spann, ColorCoded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1426 (1995) ("The law of standing is in a state of
notorious disarray."); Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System
Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 134
(2011) ("The indeterminate nature of standing doctrine is well-documented.").
11. A number of legal scholars have discussed the privileged status of white litigants in
equal protection cases challenging state considerations of race. See generally David R. Dow, The
Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative Redistricting Cases-Some Notes Concerning the
Standing of White Plaintiffs, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstandingin Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292
(1998) (discussing confused state of standing doctrine in reapportionment in which white voters
contest majority-minority districts); Pamela S. Karlan, All over the Map: The Supreme Court's
Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 278-82 (discussing absence of injury to white
litigants challenging majority-minority districts); Nichol, supra note 10, at 304 (observing that
standing "systematically favors the powerful over the powerless"); Raj Shah, An Article III
Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: A Critical Race Perspective on the Supreme Court's
Standing Jurisprudence, 61 UCLA L. REV. 196, 203-14 (2013) (detailing the different outcomes
of standing questions in equal protection cases based on the race of the plaintiff); Spann, supra
note 10, at 1454-66 (discussing standing's racially disparate application); Sundquist, supra note
10, at 135 ("[T]he Court adopts an unnecessarily narrow conception of injury and causation in
racial claims of non-white plaintiffs . . . [and] an unnecessarily broad conception . . . in cases

involving the racial claims of white plaintiffs.").
12. Cf. Nichol, supra note 10, at 326-27 (critiquing "the affirmative action exception to the
injury requirement" on the grounds that it "lodges standing law squarely on the side of [racial]
privilege").
13. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986) ("Discrimination within the
judicial system is most pernicious because it is 'a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.'" (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880))).
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and product of equal protection's diminishing commitment to racial
equality: when courts presume that race-conscious selection policies
are inherently harmful to whites, they may also presume that white
plaintiffs necessarily have standing to dispute them.1 4 These
determinations about standing are grounded in equal protection's
"colorblindness" rationale, which regards racial classifications
themselves as inherently suspect. Under this colorblindness regime,
the underlying systemic subordination of racial minorities-which
affirmative action was originally designed to redress-is irrelevant, if
not invisible.16
The principal goal of this Article is to explain and then critique
the common presumption that white litigants have inherent standing
to challenge race-conscious selection policies. It argues that this
presumption is the handiwork of an "innocence paradigm," which
assumes that whites are necessarily harmed by considerations of race
that benefit racial minorities.1 6 Under this paradigm, courts credit
white resentment of affirmative action as a cognizable injury, even
though such claims would be dismissed under the conventional rules
of standing.' 7 The innocence paradigm ratifies the view that the mere
existence of affirmative action is itself racially unjust.18 In this respect,
it shapes the very meaning of equal protection-and equality-itself.
I should be explicit that "innocence" in this Article
simultaneously embraces two different meanings. The first reflects
social and cultural presumptions that whites should not be burdened
by affirmative action unless they are somehow individually "guilty" of
racial wrongdoing. 19 These presumptions reflect equal protection

14. See infra Parts IIB, II.C, and III.
15.
See infra Part II.C.
16.
See infra Part II.C. A paradigm is a "set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices
that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the community that shares them." See paradigm,
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/paradigm, archived at http://perma.cc/4569NK9D (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
17. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 113 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) ("[A] 'generalized grievance,'
no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.").
18.
See, e.g., Jennifer Gratz, Opinion: It's Time for 'Equal'to Mean Equal, CNN.COM (Mar.
12, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://inamerica.blogs.can.com/2012/03/10/opinion-its-time-for-equal-tomean-equal, archived at http://perma.cc/JWM5-KTR4 ("My hope for Abigail Fisher is that when
the justices reference the name Fisher, they don't see an ambiguous, seemingly benign
affirmative action policy ... but that they visualize a young woman whose dreams were dashed
because of discrimination sanctioned by the state.").
19.
See infra Part II.C; see also, e.g., Erin Fuchs, How a 23-Year-Old Texan Became the
Spokeswoman for People Who Hate Affirmative Action, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 19. 2013,
12:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/abigail-fisher-face-of-affirmative-action-case-2013-6,
archived at http://perma.cc/7HVE-8VEN ("I was taught from the time I was a little girl that any
kind of discrimination was wrong. . . ." (quoting Abigail Fisher)).
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principles that have limited affirmative action to redressing identified
discrimination. Within a remedial context, courts are more willing to
burden "innocent" whites because (presumably) they have benefited,
even if passively, from racial discrimination. 20 Innocence concerns, in
other words, are less salient where predominantly white institutions
practice affirmative action because they have been "caught"
intentionally discriminating on the basis of race.
The second use of innocence relates to the availability of white
group injury for individual white plaintiffs. Innocence here rests on
the premise that affirmative action is an affront to whiteness itself.2
From this perspective, litigants need not be harmed personally by
affirmative action because of the societal injury to whites as an
undifferentiated whole.2 2 Early affirmative action cases explicitly
acknowledged this use of innocence as a construct for managing white
resentment and hostility against government considerations of race. 23
This Article contends that these cases then imported the innocence
paradigm into standing determinations in affirmative action cases,
leading to presumptions that unsuccessful white candidates were
necessarily injured by race-conscious policies. As a result of this
feedback loop, white resentment of affirmative action-even in the
absence of tangible injury-became a cognizable racial harm. 24
Here I mean to move beyond explanations offered by some
scholars that courts treat racial classifications as a wrong unto
themselves because they regard them as conveying racial stereotypes
or imposing stigmatic injury. 25 Under the innocence paradigm, the
principal concern is not that racial classifications are inherently

20.
Cf. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (discussing "passive
participant" theory); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-209 (1979)
(upholding plan that did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees"). For a
useful discussion of the role of innocence (and its corollary, sin) in a remedial context, see
generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 84-86, 91-97 (1986).
21.
See infra Part II.C.
22.
Infra Part II.C.
23.
Infra Part II.C
24.
Infra Part II.C
25.
See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 2285-86 (describing such claims in
redistricting context); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 506 (1993) (generally noting expressive harm theory of racial classifications);
cf. Stephen M. Rich, Inferred Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2013) ("Inferred [racial]
classifications contradict the common assumption that the facial neutrality of legislation is
sufficient to ensure that the legislation will not be reviewed under heightened scrutiny unless a
discriminatory purpose is found."); Shah, supra note 11, at 226 ("In short, the Court has
expressed a formalistic commitment to eliminate all or nearly all express racial classifications.").
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harmful to everyone because of stereotyping or stigma, but rather that
they harm whites in particular. The courts' underlying preoccupation
with innocence, in other words, is not about girding general norms of
nondiscrimination but rather seems acutely focused on protecting
whites as a group.26
My claim connects with theories advanced by scholars that
standing doctrine preserves existing systems of racial hierarchy and
privilege. 27 This scholarship has identified strains of innocence in
cases challenging race-conscious selection policies, 28 though it has not
fully mapped the doctrinal origins or constituent elements of
innocence in affirmative action. 29 We know relatively little, for
example, about how innocence unfolded or its dynamic shift from
substantive equal protection doctrine to the procedural realm of
standing. Nor has existing scholarship addressed the significant
doctrinal confusion that the premise of white innocence has generated
26.
See Spann, supra note 10, at 1423 (observing that the Supreme Court's standing
decisions are "racially suspicious" and "embody the very sort of racial discrimination that we rely
on the Court to prevent.").
27.
See generally Nichol, supranote 10 (arguing that judges make standing determinations
in ways that allow them to address harms that "strike closest to home"); Spann, supra note 10
(arguing that the Supreme Court's standing determinations are discriminatory to the point of
violating the Equal Protection Clause); Sundquist, supra note 10 (using social psychology
principles to demonstrate that the Court's inconsistent standing decisions can be explained by a
desire to protect privilege).
28. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and
Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2002) (noting "innocence" claim against
affirmative action); Erin E. Byrnes, Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the Fallacy of White
Innocence: Using a Theory of Moral Correlativity to Make the Case for Affirmative Action
Programsin Education, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 535, 554-59 (1999) (observing role of white innocence in
affirmative action); Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the
Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477, 477 (2006) (examining
Court's concern with protecting "innocent whites" in affirmative action cases); Thomas Ross,
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 299-308 (1990) (discussing innocence
rhetoric in affirmative action cases); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 84-86, 91-97 (1986) (discussing
"sin" and "innocence" in affirmative action cases); Sundquist, supra note 10, at 121, 135-36
(noting that the "law of standing has been remarkably consistent in its treatment of injuries by
non-white plaintiffs in cases that implicate racial inequality" and identifying a "dogma" of "white
innocence"); cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordinationand Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1529-30 (2004) [hereinafter
Equality Talk] (noting that "judgments about the harm to white applicants in the professional
school affirmative action cases seem to underlie, and partly to account for, courts' newfound
willingness to interpret and apply the constitutional presumption against racial classifications in
a way that they had not [previously]"). But see Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court-2012
Foreword:Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013) ("The justifications for strict scrutiny
in affirmative action cases no longer emphasize the importance of protecting innocent victims of
affirmative action," but rather focus on constraining uses of race in order to "protect[
expectations of fair dealing that citizens have in interacting with the government.").
29.
Cf. Shah, supra note 11, at 223 (decrying the lack of "wholly satisfying theories" to
explain "the Court's racial double standard in standing doctrine").
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in the courts and among legal scholars about how to define racial
injury.30
This Article fills that gap. It contends that the innocence
paradigm engineered the Court's reformulation of the substantive
rules of equal protection to prohibit the use of affirmative action as a
tool for remedying pervasive racial inequality. This doctrinal shift was
crucial, as it reconstituted equal protection's understanding of racial
injury in ways that were diametrically opposed for whites and racial
minorities. By downgrading systemic inequality as the basis for
affirmative considerations of race, courts refused to treat pervasive
racial disadvantage as a harm unto itself, making the subordination of
racial minorities largely invisible as a matter of equal protection. 31
And as affirmative action's mantle of constitutional legitimacy
diminished, its perceived costs to whites increased. This led to
expansive notions of racial injury that have enabled white litigants to
contest even the most de minimis uses of race. As a result of the
innocence paradigm, courts have come to regard white resentment and
hostility to race-conscious selection policies as sufficient to confer
injury, even if such policies have had no tangible, personal impact on
white litigants. 32 This shift in equal protection doctrine has led to
otherwise unexplainable outcomes like those in Fisher in which the
white plaintiff is not demonstrably harmed by government
considerations of race but nonetheless is allowed to proceed with her
claim.33
Thus, the innocence paradigm first restructured the
substantive rules of equal protection and now has affected its
procedural rules by threatening to loosen official standing
requirements for white litigants challenging race-conscious selection
policies. The premise of white innocence helps to explain the
connective tissue between substance and procedure in the realm of
race and equal protection. 34 When activated, the innocence paradigm
serves both as a substantive check on the constitutional merits of raceconscious policies and then confers a corresponding injury on any
whites who are subject to them. The presumed illegitimacy of
affirmative action creates the (wrong) presumption that all whites are
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. Infra Part I.C.
32.
See infra Parts II.C & IV.
See infra Part II.B.
33.
34.
Alan Freeman observed the innocence problem in his discussion of the "perpetrator
perspective." See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1054-56 (1978); see also infra Part I.C.1.
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victimized by it, both individually and as a group, because it is
adverse to white interests. 35 Understanding this cross-fertilization
between equal protection's substantive and procedural dimensions 3 6
helps us to appreciate the role that standing doctrine plays in both
defining and policing the very meaning of racial equality.
The consequences of the innocence paradigm are significant.
One obvious problem is that it is explicitly oriented to protecting
whites,
which violates equal protection's
own norms of
nondiscrimination.3 7 The result is a racial asymmetry in the
procedural rules of equal protection in which white plaintiffs are able
to advance their claims against race-conscious selection policies, while
minority litigants challenging more systemic racial injuries cannot.
Some of this asymmetry can be attributed to separation-of-powers
concerns and judicial capacity to redress systemic claims,3 8 but this
explanation does not fully account for the success of reverse
discrimination plaintiffs who have overcome standing barriers that
blocked minority litigants.
At bottom, the innocence paradigm helps to legitimate systems
that disadvantage persons of color but privilege whites. It also helps to
account for the curious lack of objection to other kinds of preferences
in admissions systems. The University of Texas, for example, gives
state residents a nearly exclusive advantage in its admissions policy, a
preference that inured to Fisher's benefit as a Texas resident. 39 Other
universities also give legacy preferences to children of alumni that
predominantly benefit white applicants. 40 All of this suggests that the

35. See Spann, supra note 10, at 1461.
36. See Nichol, supra note 10, at 330-34 (discussing "covert constitutionalizing"); cf.
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 2291 (observing that the "personal stake" required in
standing jurisprudence "necessarily refers to the underlying substantive claims"). In a seminal
article, William Fletcher contended that it is impossible to abstract standing's injury
requirement from "normative judgments" about the merits of the underlying claim. See William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 232, 265-276 (1988). I discuss this
point further infra Part IV.
37. See Spann, supra note 10, at 1423 ("[C]lose examination suggests that the Supreme
Court's standing decisions embody the very sort of racial discrimination that we rely on the
Court to prevent.").
38. See infra Parts IL.A & III.B.2.
39.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting Fisher's
Texas residency); id. at 227 (observing that "Texas residents are allotted 90% of all available
seats" at the University of Texas).
40.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting
advantage conferred by legacy preferences on children of alumni); Adrian Liu, Affirmative Action
& Negative Action: How Jian Li's Case Can Benefit Asian Americans, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 391,
404 (2008) (observing that legacy preferences "primarily benefit White applicants because they
are more likely to have family members who are alumni of the university").
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problem of affirmative action is not preferences per se, but any
preferences that benefit racial minorities in particular.
In this respect, the innocence paradigm has both a
discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. It is acutely
focused on race. As a result, courts that embrace innocence fail to
adhere to rules that are racially impartial, leading to the perception
that standing doctrine has simply become grist for advancing an
agenda against any race-conscious selection policies in order to protect
whites as a group. 41 By exposing the latent operation of innocence, the
hope is that we can increase judicial accountability and transparency
and perhaps eliminate innocence's corrupting influence. 42
The innocence paradigm has social harms as well. Allowing
plaintiffs who have not been tangibly injured by race-conscious
selection policies to proceed against them in court gives the public a
false impression about the scope of affirmative action. Indeed, Fisher
herself did not dispute that the consideration of race in the University
of Texas's policy is actually quite modest. 4 3 And yet the national public
conversation that emerged around the Fisher litigation misses this
crucial fact, reflecting misinformation about the actual costs of
affirmative action to individual white applicants. 44 The assumption
that affirmative action denies whites access to higher education, jobs,
and government contracts is common, and yet it has been
demonstrably wrong as applied to white plaintiffs in a surprising
number of anti-affirmative action cases. 45 If these cases are any
indication, the burden of affirmative action is not nearly as high as
many people think.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II begins with a brief
introduction to standing doctrine and explains the innocence problem
through the lens of the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher. It then
41.
See Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 85, 95 (2012) (describing Fisher as an "empty vehicle for ideological struggle");
Nichol, supra note 10; cf. Spann, supra note 10, at 1461 ("In virtually every affirmative action
case, the white plaintiff has been accorded standing to challenge the affirmative action program
at issue.").
42. See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 42 (2001) (discussing how a
"sociological account" of antidiscrimination law makes sociological reasoning more explicit in
ways that enable courts to be held accountable).
43.
See infra Part II.B.
44. After being unable to find other plaintiffs to challenge the University of Texas policy,
Ed Blum, who founded the Project on Fair Representation, recruited Abigail Fisher,
the daughter of a personal friend, to become the plaintiff in the case. See
Joan Biskupic, Special Report: Behind U.S.
Race Cases, a Little-Known Recruiter,
REUTERS.COM (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/us-usa-courtcasemaker- idUSBRE8B3OV220121204, archived at http://perma.cc/M6VC-DL3W.
45. See infra Parts III & IV.
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identifies the innocence paradigm's elements, its origins, and its
application in other cases as a foundation for understanding how it
threatens to reshape the very notion of racial injury in standing in
diametrically opposed ways for whites and racial minorities. This Part
sets the stage for my critique that the focus on white innocence leads
to racially disparate applications of standing doctrine. It contends that
white plaintiffs challenging racial classifications are subject to more
lenient rules than minority plaintiffs challenging systemic racial
injuries, which generate perceptions of racial bias in the federal
judicial system.
Mapping this argument requires particular attention to Justice
Powell's plurality opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, which laid the foundation for major doptrinal shifts in equal
protection in the area of affirmative action. 46 This Part describes the
undercurrents of innocence in several important doctrinal moves in
Powell's opinion: his conclusions that strict scrutiny should apply to
government considerations of race in voluntary affirmative action,
that state efforts to redress "societal discrimination" are not a
compelling interest, and that the limited use of race to pursue
diversity in higher education is constitutionally acceptable.4 7 It
unpacks the chief elements of the innocence paradigm: that white
resentment of affirmative action is itself a racial injury and the
assumption that government considerations of race subordinate
whites as a group. In so doing, it exposes the racial motivation that
underlies the innocence paradigm.
Part III returns to the central theme of this Article: that the
innocence paradigm unleashed in Bakke has eroded the traditional
elements of standing doctrine for white plaintiffs in affirmative action
cases. This connects the argument laid out in Part II regarding the
reconceptualization of racial harm in equal protection to the
procedural redefinition of racial injury now threatened in the context
of standing. As the range of permissible justifications for affirmative
action narrowed under equal protection, the perception that such
policies harmed whites who were individually innocent of racial
wrongdoing has intensified. 48 This in turn has magnified the
assumption that affirmative action injures whites, enabling white
plaintiffs to litigate their claims in federal court, despite the absence
of any demonstrated personal injury. This Part explains the doctrinal
consequences of the Court's heightened focus on white racial injury
46.
47.
48.

See infra Part II.C.
Infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
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under the innocence paradigm in the context of the "diminished
opportunity" principle. 49 It then discusses the racially disparate
application of this principle and the Court's refusal to apply it to
minority plaintiffs who challenged the racial impact of government
policies that threatened them with future harm.
Part IV.A discusses the impact of the innocence paradigm as
reflected in the current confusion in the courts about the cognizability
of racial harm in equal protection challenges to affirmative action. I
concentrate on the very puzzling Supreme Court decision in Texas v.
Lesage which, having compounded the Court's mistakes in Bakke, is a
source of confusion among lower courts and scholars alike about the
cognizability of racial injury in equal protection cases.s0 Part IV.B
returns to a discussion of the substantive dimensions of standing
doctrine as both a product and agent of racial inequality. Part IV.C
concludes with a modest proposal. Here I contend that courts should
align standing rules so that anti-affirmative action litigants are
subject to the same requirements as minority plaintiffs who have
challenged other forms of racial injury. In practical terms, this means
that white litigants should have standing to claim damages only if
they have in fact been denied a benefit as a result of a race-conscious
selection policy. These plaintiffs should not have standing to seek
either retrospective or prospective relief simply because at some point
in the past they have been subjected to a policy that generally
considers race. I conclude by applying this proposal to Fisher.

II. THE SINS OF INNOCENCE: SUBSTANCE AS PROCEDURE
Fisher v. University of Texas fits into an ongoing debate about
the merits of affirmative action. But the case also raises crucial
questions about how we understand racial injury for purposes of
standing in equal protection cases involving state considerations of
race. Before turning to these points specifically, a quick refresher on
the fundamentals of standing doctrine is instructive. Section A covers
that terrain. Section B briefly introduces the standing problem in
Fisher as a prelude to Part III's introduction of the innocence
paradigm.

49.
50.

Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
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A. A Brief Primeron Standing
The elements of standing doctrine are straightforward. Under
Article III, federal courts may only adjudicate actual "cases" and
"controversies." 1 To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that she has suffered an "injury in fact" as a result of the
defendant's conduct. 52 To be judicially cognizable, an injury must
involve infringement of a legally protected interest that is "concrete"
and "particularized,"53 meaning that the plaintiff is affected in a
"personal and individual way," 54 is "among the injured,"5 5 and,
therefore, has a "direct stake in the outcome of the case."5 6 The harm
must be either "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,"
and there must be a causal connection between the harm and the
challenged conduct.5 7 It must be " 'likely,' as opposed to merely
'speculative,' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision."5 8 Finally, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
each of these elements is satisfied.59
In standing doctrine, an important distinction exists between
judicially cognizable injuries and "generalized grievances."6 0 A
generalized grievance refers to an act that may injure the public as a

51.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
52. But see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and PrivateRights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 275 (2008) (contending that the injury-in-fact requirement is "superfluous" in cases
alleging the violation of private rights).
53.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
54. Id. at 560 n.1.
55. Id. at 563.
56.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
57.
58. Id. at 561.
59. Id. ("The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the
standing] elements.").
60. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2662:
A litigant "raising only a generally available grievance about government-claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy."
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74). Generalized grievances typically, though not necessarily,
involve claims against the government. Cf., e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007)
(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claim under the Elections Clause of the
Constitution based on generalized grievance against government conduct). The Court has treated
the ban on generalized grievances as both a constitutional and prudential limitation on standing.
Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that
Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2240
(1999).
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whole or no one in particular. 6 ' Standing doctrine's rejection of
generalized grievances rests on the premise that a plaintiff must
"assert her own legal rights and interests" rather than those of third
parties. 62 Being a "concerned bystander" will not suffice, "[n]o matter
how deeply committed" a plaintiff may be to her cause. 63 In Diamond
v. Charles, for example, the Court refused to allow a pediatrician to
intervene to defend a state's abortion law based on his "conscientious
object[ion]" to abortions. 64 Similarly, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the
Supreme Court concluded that proponents of a statewide initiative
that amended the California constitution to bar same-sex marriage
did not have standing to defend the law after state officials declined to
appeal an adverse ruling. 65 A simple belief in the importance of the
state law and its underlying principles was not a sufficient harm by
itself to justify standing. 66
These requirements are thought to reflect separation-of-powers
concerns about the proper role of the federal judiciary. 67 Requiring the
plaintiff to show that she is personally and causally harmed by the
challenged conduct, to an extent sufficient to give her a stake in a
remedy, helps cabin the reach of the federal courts.6 8 Allowing
plaintiffs with only generalized grievances to proceed in federal court
encroaches on the democratic prerogatives of the legislative and
executive branches to resolve questions of "public significance."6 9
Standing, therefore, helps to ensure that the judiciary is not called

61.
Siegel, supra note 10, at 99; see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
62. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
63. Id.
64. 476 U.S. 54, 67 (1986).
65.
133 S. Ct. at 2663.
66. Id. at 2659 (stating that "keen interest" is not enough to confer standing in absence of
"concrete and particularized injury").
67. See Ernest A. Young, In Praiseof Judge Fletcher-And of General Standing Principles,
65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 483-84 (2013) (justifying injury-in-fact requirement based on separation of
powers principles). But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459
(2008) (critiquing "separation of powers" rationale as oversimplified and charging that standing
doctrine is ill-suited to different separation of powers concerns); Siegel, supra note 10, at 95-102
(challenging separation of powers theories as basis for standing). See generally Scalia, supra note
61 (arguing that the doctrine of standing is essential to maintaining separation of powers and
that courts should more stringently apply the requirement of a particularized injury in order to
abate the problem of "overjudicialization").
68.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III.").
69.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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upon to resolve abstract problems that would be better addressed by
the political branches.7 0
As discussed more fully in Part III, the generalized grievance
rule should pose a major problem for anti-affirmative action plaintiffs
who cannot show a specific injury from state considerations of race.
Affirmative action policies do in fact benefit minority applicants, but
this benefit does not invariably cause white applicants to be rejected.
One gets an offer, and the other does not. It might be the case that the
rejected candidate would have received the offer if the first candidate
had been turned down. But it also might have made no difference
whatsoever. In other words, we cannot assume that one candidate's
gain is necessarily the other's loss. Some courts purport to get around
this problem by presuming that all rejected white applicants have
suffered an "implied injury" as a result of the consideration of race
itself.71 But an implied injury is no different than a generalized
grievance. Courts' application of unequal rules of standing to antiaffirmative action litigants illustrates the operation of the innocence
paradigm. 72
There is another important distinction in standing doctrine
that is crucial to understanding the problem in Fisher and the split
among lower courts as plaintiffs challenging race-conscious selection
policies push the outer boundaries of racial injury. This distinction lies
in the difference between past and future harm. Attention to the
nature of the actual or threatened harm matters because it
determines both the causation analysis and the kind of relief that the
plaintiff is eligible to seek. A plaintiff who claims a future injury must
show that such injury is "imminent." 73 An abstract likelihood that the
harm will occur is not enough to satisfy the imminence requirement. 74
Rather, there must be some concrete showing that the harm is
forthcoming or ongoing.75 Similarly, if the injury has already occurred,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct caused the
injury.7 6 And, finally, because of standing's redressability

70. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
See infra Part II.C.
71.
72.
See infra Part III.
73. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
See id. at 564 ("Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
74.
controversy regarding injunctive relief . .. if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects." (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 95-96 (1983))).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
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requirement, the asserted injury must align with the requested
relief.77
Thus, a plaintiff who claims a future injury can only seek
future-oriented, prospective relief. 78 A plaintiff who asserts an "actual"
or past harm can only claim retrospective relief, like damages. 79 A
showing of past injury is not enough by itself to demonstrate a
likelihood of future injury and vice versa.8 0 Accordingly, a plaintiff
may not seek injunctive relief based on a showing of past harm, just as
a plaintiff may not seek damages based on a showing of future harm
under the conventional rules of standing.8 1 As we shall see, this
distinction matters in Fisher, where the plaintiff has sought damages
for the purported past harm of being evaluated for admission to the
University of Texas under a race-conscious policy and has sought to
bootstrap onto her claim standing principles that developed to address
the possibility of future injury. Fisher's effort to push the outer
boundaries of standing doctrine reflects a highly attenuated definition
of racial harm that has also surfaced in other court decisions in which
courts take the plaintiffs injury for granted. The casual assumption of
racial harm and the corresponding relaxation of standing
requirements illustrate both the operation and reach of the innocence
paradigm.
The elements of standing doctrine reveal that the
characterization of the injury is critical as the causation and
redressability analysis both flow from the initial definition of the
harm. 82 As discussed in Part II.C below, this helps us to appreciate
Justice Powell's strategic turn in Bakke, which recalibrated the
meaning of future injury to benefit affirmative action plaintiffs.
Bakke's broad conception of racial injury set the stage for other
challenges to affirmative action by white plaintiffs, including Abigail
Fisher, at the same time that the Court declined to apply the same
expansive standing principles to minority plaintiffs who challenged
systems of racial subordination.8 1 Part B below turns to the standing
problem in Fisherto illustrate this point.

77.
Id. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
78.
See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
79.
See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1464-65 (describing the potential effect of characterization of harm on the Court's
determination regarding causation and, therefore, standing).
83.
See infra Part II.C.
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B. Illustratingthe Problem: Fisher v. University of Texas
In 2008, Abigail Fisher was denied admission to the entering
class at the University of Texas at Austin. 84 She sued the university
for racial discrimination under an equal protection theory based on its
consideration of race in its admissions process.

85

The Supreme Court

punted on the ultimate question regarding whether the university's
policy was constitutional and instead remanded the case to the lower
court to reconsider whether the policy was narrowly tailored.86
The most curious aspect of the Court's decision, however, was
what it omitted: why Fisher had standing to sue in the first place.8 7 As
a vehicle for deciding the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions, Fisher was riddled with problems. 8 Because she had
graduated from another university, she was ineligible for prospective
injunctive relief, which left only her damages claim.89 But her
standing to claim retrospective relief was also far from certain90 given
evidence that she would have been rejected even under a race-neutral
system.9 1 At the very least, the university's showing raised questions
about whether its policy had caused her denial of admission. Although
the matter received some attention during oral argument, 92 the Court
avoided the question completely in its opinion.93

84. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2415.
87. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 2014) (observing that
the university's standing arguments "carry force" and noting that the Court "did not address the
issue of standing, although it was squarely presented to it").
88.
See Chandler, supra note 41, at 41-42. It is not clear that Fisher pleaded a
compensable claim in her complaint. She failed to request compensatory damages and requested
the return of a fee that would not have been refunded even had she been admitted to the
university. See Appellees' Statement Concerning Further Proceedings on Remand at 5-6, Fisher,
758 F.3d 633 (No. 09-50822), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2013-0723.UT.Statement.re.remand.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3JUM-RUEA.
89.
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (observing that,
at the time of its opinion, Fisher had disclaimed any intention to reapply to the University of
Texas and, therefore, could not seek prospective injunctive relief), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013). Note that Fisher had graduated from college by the time the case reached the Supreme
Court. See Brief for Respondents at 16-17 n.6, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), available
at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%/`20Respondents.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cclWK2J-VPQY.
90.
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597-98 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
91. Id.
92. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55:5-13, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345).
93. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 640.
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1. The Role of Race in Admissions
Appreciating the standing problem requires us first to unpack
some aspects of the university's admissions process and the role that
race plays in the evaluation of individual candidates. Under state law,
the university is required to admit all Texas students who graduate in
the top ten percent of their public high school class.94 Students who
are not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan are evaluated
based on a whole file review of each applicant that considers academic
achievement and other personal factors.9 5 During this phase of the
process, each applicant is assigned an Academic Index score based on
academic achievement and a separate score that factors in the
personal qualities of the applicant. 96 This latter score is based on two
essays and another score, the Personal Achievement Score ("PAS"). 97
The PAS score ranges from one to six and is based on
consideration of "equally-weighted" factors, including leadership
ability, extracurricular
activities,
work experience,
awards,
community service, and "special circumstances."9 8 The "special
circumstances" factor is further broken down into seven criteria,
which include the socioeconomic profile of the applicant's family and
her school; her family caretaking responsibilities; whether she comes
from a single-parent home; whether English is a second language; her
SAT/ACT score relative to the average score of her school; and, finally,
her race.99 Race, therefore, is "a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor"

94.
Fisher, 133 S. ct. at 2416. Approximately sixty percent to eighty percent of the firstyear class is admitted as a result of this law, though they are not necessarily admitted to their
first choice program. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 595; Brief for Respondents at 8, Fisher,
133 S. Ct. 2411
(No.
11-345),
available at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
Brief%20for%2ORespondents.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/2DCB-MWRP. Admission is
granted by individual schools or majors. Therefore, applicants technically compete for admission
against other applicants who have indicated their preference for the same program. Fisher, 645
F. Supp. 2d at 595, 598.
95.
See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 638 (noting that applicants not admitted as a result of Top Ten
Percent Law or as a result of "an exceptionally high" Academic Index score are evaluated
through holistic review).
96.
Id.
97.
One score is the Academic Index ("Al"). Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596. The other is the
Personal Achievement Index ("PAI'). Id. The Al is calculated according to high school class rank;
completion of the university's required high school curriculum, with an enhancement awarded to
applicants who have surpassed the required curriculum; and SAT or ACT scores. Id. Some
applicants with a high academic achievement score are admitted solely based on their score and
others with scores that are too low are presumptively denied. Id. However, the files of this latter
group may receive a full review. Id.
98.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 94, at 13.
99. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
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of the admissions process.1 00 At the final stage of admissions,
applicants are reduced to a single number based on their combined
scores and are not identified by race. 101 Therefore, admissions officers
do not know the race of the applicant at the time they make
admissions decisions. 102
All of this demonstrates that race plays a highly contextualized
role in the admissions process at the University of Texas.
Significantly, a minority candidate does not necessarily benefit from
any consideration of race:103 it can positively enhance the admissions
profile of any applicant, including white applicants, or it may not be a
consideration at all. 104 Therefore, although race is "undisputedly a
meaningful factor that can make a difference in the evaluation of a
student's application,"10 5 it is not "scored" or assigned a numerical

100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 94, at 13. Race is identified on the cover of the
admissions file, which means that reviewers are aware of it throughout the evaluation, but it is
not known at the actual admissions stage. Nor do admissions officers monitor the racial
demographics of admitted students to determine whether a particular candidate should be
admitted. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98.
101. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
102. Each applicant's Al and PAI scores are plotted on a matrix that corresponds to the
particular school or major at UT Austin to which the applicant is seeking admission. The matrix
contains the AI score on one axis and the PAI score on the other. Admissions officers then draw a
"stair-step line on the matrix," which "divid[es] the cells of applicants who will be admitted from
those that will be denied." Brief for Respondents, supra note 94, at 12. Critically, PAI scoreswhich, as discussed below, can include background consideration of an applicant's race-are set
long before this process occurs. Id. at 13. At this final stage, applicants are reduced to a singular
number based on their combined Al and PAI scores and are not identified by race. When
admissions officers draw the stair-step line that divides the cells (which contain the scores of
applicants), the racial demographics of each cell and, therefore, of each applicant, are unknown.
Id. at 12-13.
103. For example, race may factor into the evaluation of a white applicant who is student
body president at a majority-black high school. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 94, at 14
("[lit is undisputed . . . that consideration of race may benefit any application (even nonminorities) .... ). Race may also factor into the evaluation of an applicant who, for example,
mentored minority youth. See Joint Appendix at 168a-70a, app. F, Exh. 5 to Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment, Deposition of Kedra Ishop, dated Oct. 6, 2008, Fisher v. Univ. of
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
available at
(No.
11-345),
Tex. at Austin
Joint%20Appendix.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JD22-WBM9; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining the factors considered for the personal
achievement score).
104. Because of the nuanced role that race plays, it is difficult to determine which, if any,
minority or white applicants have been "positively or negatively affected" by it and which
candidates would have been admitted or denied in its absence. Joint Appendix, supra note 103,
at 157a, 210a-11a, 215a; see also Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (describing the application
process). Although it is not possible to know how the consideration of race in the admissions
process actually affected Fisher's application, the University showed that Fisher would have
been denied admission even if she had received a perfect personal achievement score. See infra
Part I.B.2.
105. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98.
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value.10 6 Instead, it is used to assess how well applicants function in
racial environments that are different from their own' 0 7 and to
contextualize the students' achievements and personal experiences. 0 8
Indeed, the modesty of the policy is underscored by its slight impact
on the number of African-American and Latino students admitted. In
2008, the year of Fisher's application, only 216 African-American and
Latino students were admitted through holistic review out of 6,322
total students in the first year class. 0 9 And yet, because of the
nuanced role that race plays, even this number-approximately three
percent of the entering class-potentially overstates the influence of
race in the admissions process.
2. Competing Conceptions of Racial Injury
Fisher's pleadings suggest several different theories of her
injury, which are crucial for understanding the particular operation of
the innocence paradigm.1 0 Fisher first argues that she "likely" would
have been admitted into the University of Texas at Austin "but for" its
"use of race-based criteria in its admissions decisions.""' The problem
with this frame is that it is inconsistent with the actual workings of
the university's admissions process, as described above. That is, the
argument incorrectly presumes that the precise impact of race can be
determined for each candidate and, most importantly, that the school's

106. See Joint Appendix, supra note 103, at 169a (explaining how race is factored into the
admissions process); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 270-72 (2003) (striking down
points-based admissions policy).
107. The Associate Director of Admissions at the University of Texas captured the goal as
follows: "[Flor us racial diversity is about how does the student maneuver in their own world,
how do they maneuver in someone else's world, what kind of awareness do they have of their
world, what kind of awareness do they have of the other possibilities that are out there?" Joint
Appendix, supra note 103, at 157a, 210a-11a.
108. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597; Joint Appendix, supra note 103, at 206a-07a.
109. Fisher, 758 F.3d 633, 668 (5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting).
110. Another plaintiff, Rachel Michalewicz, also sued. See Joint Appendix at 38a ¶ 1, app. C,
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief, filed Aug. 13, 2008,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (No. 11-345), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/
Documents/Joint%2oAppendix.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JD22-WBM9 (including complaint
brought by Abigail Noel Fisher and Rachel Multer Michalewicz). However, she later dropped out
of the litigation. See Associated Press, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
ChallengesAffirmative
Action
in
Higher Education, DAILY
TEXAN,
Feb.
21,
2012, http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2012/02/21/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austinchallenges-affirmative-action-in-higher, archived at http://perma.cc/HD7F-QT48 ("The other
woman has since dropped out of the case. . . .").
111. Joint Appendix, supra note 110, 38a 1 120 (emphasis added); see also Fisher, 758 F.3d
at 662-63 (Garza, J., dissenting) (describing Fisher's claim that her score would have exceeded
the cutoff if race had been eliminated entirely from the process).
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consideration of race made the difference in her particular rejection.
Yet this theory does not bear out under scrutiny.1 12
The year that Fisher applied was a very competitive year. After
1 3 Fisher became one of
the Top Ten Percent Plan seats were filled,s
the 17,131 applicants vying for the 1,216 seats that remained' 14 for
Texas residents.115 Only 186 available seats were left in the College of
Liberal Arts for undeclared majors who, like Fisher, were residents of
the state." 6 As a result of her relatively low Academic Index score,
combined with the shortage of remaining seats, Fisher was rejected
from the fall 2008 entering class." 7 Although she claimed that she lost
her seat on account of race, the university illustrated that Fisher
would not have been accepted to the first-year class for fall 2008 even
with a "perfect" score of six on her Personal Achievement Index.118 In
other words, the university would have made the same decision to
reject her under a process in which race was considered as part of her
application." 9 Therefore, her claim that she would have been admitted
"but for" race just does not add up.
Fisher's second claim is that she was "injured by UT Austin's
use of racial preferences because she was not considered on an equal

112. See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 653-54.
113. Because of her high school rank, Fisher was ineligible for admission under the Top Ten
Percent Plan. See Joint Appendix at 96a ¶ 112, app. D, Answer of Defendants to Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, (No. 11-345), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irlal
Documents/Joint%20Appendix.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ JD22-WBM9. Fisher applied to
major in business, which was considered by the university to be an "impacted" program, meaning
that demand for the program was so high that the university capped the percentage of Top Ten
Percent admits to seventy-five percent of available seats. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595-96
(W.D. Tex. 2009) (explaining the application process for "impacted majors").
114. Fisher, 758 F.3d. at 637.
115. The university's admissions process is divided into three applicant groups: Texas
residents, domestic non-Texas residents, and international students. Texas residents compete
only against other Texas residents. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
116. See Joint Appendix at 412a-13a 1 14, app. 0, Affidavit of Kedra B. Ishop filed Feb. 23,
2009 (No. 11-345), available at http:// www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Joint%20Appendix.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/JD22-WBM9 (explaining that these seats were for undeclared majors
in the College of Liberal Arts).
117. Fisher's Academic Index score was 3.1, short of the 3.5 score that was necessary for
admission. Id. at 415a-16a. She was also denied admission to the summer program. However,
she continued to be eligible to enter UT Austin through the alternative Coordinated Admissions
Program, which would have allowed her to transfer to the flagship campus after enrolling in
another college program. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Fisher v. Texas,
645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (A-08-CA-263-SS), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
20.Order.Denying.Motion.for.Preliminary.Injunction.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/56N-H6Y8
("The record shows both Plaintiffs' applications were given a second reading since UT offered
them both admission to [the Coordinated Admission Program]").
118. Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 416a ¶ 18.
119. Id.
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basis with African-American and Hispanic applicants who applied for
admission to the same incoming freshman class." 120 The idea here is
that the consideration of race created an uneven playing field that
lowered her chances of admission. As we shall see, the Supreme Court
has accepted this framing of racial harm as a cognizable injury, but
only in claims for prospective injunctive relief, not for retrospective
claims like Fisher's that involve damages. 121 The supposed injury from
an uneven playing field is consistent with current doctrine if we are
focused on the potential future impact of a continuing affirmative
action policy on a white plaintiff. But under the conventional rules of
standing, which require alignment of injury and remedy, it should
make no difference for Fisher who has graduated from another college
and, therefore, is not eligible for injunctive relief.
Finally, and most critically, Fisher claims that the "denial of a
race-neutral evaluation" of her application "alone" was sufficient
injury. 122 As an initial matter, it is not necessarily evident what a
"race-neutral evaluation" means in the context of admissions at UT
Austin. It might mean that Fisher is arguing for the same
"consideration" of race in her application as minority applicants. But,
as already discussed, even if Fisher received a perfect Personal
Achievement Score that factored in some theoretical consideration for
race, UT Austin illustrated that she still would have been denied
admission from the fall 2008 class. 123 More to the point, however, this
conception of racial injury is inconsistent with how race is actually
used in the admissions process because race is not a quantifiable,
standalone criterion that necessarily applies to individual
candidates. 124 Rather, race is considered in the broader context of an
individual applicant's life circumstances. 12 5 It measures the

120. Joint Appendix, supra note 110, at 68a, 75a I¶N 119, 155.
121. See infra Part II.
122. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22 n.6, 23, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (A-08CA-263-SS); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 92, at 6:4-8 (argument of Bert
Rein, counsel for Abigail Fisher) ("[T]he denial of her right to equal treatment is a constitutional
injury in and of itself, and we had claimed certain damages on that.").
123. See supra text accompanying note 118; cf. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 263-64 (5th
Cir. 2000) (concluding that university need not "replicate" the challenged process "in its entirety"
to satisfy its burden of proof for purposes of determining liability, but rather need only prove
that plaintiff would have been denied "in the absence of unconstitutional conduct").
124. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597:
Given [the university] guidelines and the fact [that] race, like all the other elements,
is never awarded a numerical value or considered alone, it is difficult to evaluate
which applicants have been positively or negatively affected by its consideration or
which applicants were ultimately offered admission due to their race who would not
have otherwise been offered admission.
125. Id. (describing contextual consideration of race).

2015]

THE SINS OF INNOCENCE

319

applicant's willingness to encounter a racial environment different
from the one to which she is accustomed, and, therefore, it can be a
positive factor for white and minority applicants alike. 126 Accordingly,
for a whole range of reasons, Fisher's assertion that she was denied a
"race-neutral evaluation" misconceives the nature of the admissions
process. Race may be a factor as to some candidates or not at all, and
whether it plays any role is a nuanced and highly individualized
judgment.
To summarize, the university's showing that Fisher would have
been rejected from its entering class if some racial consideration had
"benefited" her application indicates that race did not cause her to be
denied admission. 127 Thus, boiled down to its essence, Fisher's final
claim is that she was injured simply by being subjected to a process
that considered race, even if it had no discernible impact on her
personally.128 The contention is that the simple presence of race in a
decisionmaking process that uses affirmative action confers an
implied injury on all white candidates. The conception of white racial
harm here is so broad that it nearly eviscerates the standing inquiry.
This seems plainly wrong, and yet arguments like these have gained
significant traction in the courts. 129 How did this happen?
The next Section locates the source of the problem in equal
protection doctrine itself, which profoundly influenced conceptions of
both the racial harm to white candidates as a consequence of
affirmative action and the presumed racial wrongdoing by universities
that practiced it. As we shall see, this process unfolded in two steps.
First, the Court rejected pervasive racial disadvantage as a recognized
justification for race-conscious affirmative action. 130 Second, as the
constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action diminished, the
assumption that whites were unjustly burdened by such policies
increased. 131 Therefore, as equal protection standards became less

126. See Joint Appendix, supra note 103, at 169a (explaining how race is factored into the
admissions process); see also Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 407a ¶ 4 ("[B]ecause race is a
factor considered in the context of each applicant's entire file, it may be a beneficial factor for
minorities or non-minorities alike, depending on the applicant's unique circumstances.").
127. See Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 416a 1 18 ("[E]ven if Ms. Fisher and Ms.
Michalewicz had each received a 'perfect' PAI score of 6, neither would have received an offer of
admission to the freshman entering class of fall 2008.").
128. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 663 (2014) (Garza, J., dissenting)
is not her rejection, but the denial of equal protection of the laws
("Fisher's alleged injury ...
during the admissions decision process.").
129. See infra Part II.C.
130. See infra Part II.C.
131. See infra Part II.C.
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hospitable to affirmative action, the procedural rules of standing
became more hospitable to anti-affirmative action plaintiffs.
C. The Innocence Paradigmin Equal Protection
It is common to think of innocence in the law in the context of
criminall 32 or tort law. 133 But we often overlook the defining role that
innocence plays in affirmative action cases. 134 It surfaces repeatedly in
challenges to race-conscious selection policies in higher education,
contracting, employment, and school desegregation. 135 The reason has
to do with two related assumptions. The first assumption is that
whites are inherently harmed by affirmative action-specifically, that
they are injured by the use of racial classifications to redress racial
inequality for which they are not individually responsible. 136 The
second assumption is that those who practice affirmative action have
themselves engaged in racial wrongdoing. This is the essence of the
innocence paradigm; it rests on the premise that whites are "innocent"
of continuing racial inequality and that they are, thereby, "injured" by
state considerations of race that seek to redress it. As a result, the use
of race to identify persons for the purpose of distributing government
benefits is itself regarded as harmful, even if white plaintiffs have not
been specifically denied a government benefit as a result of the
contested policy itself. 137
To understand this point, we have to explore the origins of
innocence, which is now deeply embedded in equal protection's
operating system. Indeed, it is so engrained that we have forgotten
132. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1551-52
(1997) (discussing "moral wrongfulness"); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1083, 1084-91 (2011) (describing different conceptions of innocence in criminal justice).
133. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-MarketTort,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1781 (2013) (noting "presumption" of innocence in tort law).
134. Cf. Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79
TEX. L. REV. 643, 644-48 (2001) (observing the similarities between the "causation" test in tort
and the atomized treatment of the remedial justification as a defense to voluntary affirmative
action program).
135. See Nichol, supra note 10, at 322-29; Sundquist, supra note 10, at 141 (noting the
"much looser interpretation of injury and causation in cases brought by white 'victims' of racebased remedial admissions, employment, and desegregation programs").
136. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 662-63 (5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J.,
dissenting).
137. See Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the
Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CALIF. L. REV. 799, 803 (2003) ("[A]ffirmative action programs
seem threatening to white people whether or not they result in much actual change. Affirmative
action disturbs settled norms even when whites have no conscious attachment to privilege or
intent to discriminate.")
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how it became lodged there in the first place. As the next sections
reveal, the Supreme Court in earlier equal protection cases was very
explicit about its use of the innocence paradigm. However, once the
paradigm was fully baked into equal protection doctrine, it receded
from public view. Innocence is still operative, but courts are no longer
explicit about its role. 3 8 And, because it is hidden, we can neither hold
courts accountable for its operation nor understand its impact. The
Section below describes the origins of the innocence paradigm in
substantive equal protection doctrine as a predicate for understanding
its procedural turns in standing.
1. Invisible Innocence
Alan Freeman foreshadowed the explicit unveiling of the
innocence paradigm in affirmative action in his early article
discussing the "perpetrator perspective" in equal protection.' 3 9
According to Freeman, equal protection adopted the perpetrator
perspective
to rationalize
and
legitimize
systemic
racial
disadvantage.1 4 0 Adopting a perpetrator viewpoint enables courts to
ignore the experiences of racial minorities as members of "a perpetual
underclass" 141 that suffers from a chronic shortage of resources,
opportunity, and choice.1 42 Under this view, the sole purpose of equal
protection is to prohibit conduct that intentionally inflicts racial harm
and to "neutralize" that conduct, rather than addressing the systemic,
intergenerational disparities that result from it. '4
Within this framework, equal protection treats racial
discrimination "not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the
misguided conduct of particular actors."1 44 That is, law bears down on
intentional discrimination caused by an identifiable party and is
indifferent to societal conditions that systemically disadvantage racial
minorities.1 45 Thus, the equal protection problem disappears once the
intentional conduct and the conditions that are directly traceable to

138. See infra Part II.C.15.
139. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 1049.
140. Id. at 1052-53.
141. Id. at 1052.
142. Id. at 1051 (observing role of law in "legitimiz[ing] the existing social structure and,
especially, class relationships within that structure").
143. Id. at 1053.
144. Id. at 1054.
145. See infra Part II.C.2 & 3.
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that conduct have been redressed.1 46 In this regard, the perpetrator
perspective's frame of reference is ahistorical and divorced from social
context: 14 7 it presumes that equal opportunity exists for everyone and
that any disruption to the nation's basic system of fairness is episodic
and the consequence of isolated individual conduct. 148 Once this
individualized conduct is corrected, the system returns to an
equilibrium of racial fairness, with any resulting disparities
presumably occasioned by a lack of individual merit.1 49
The innocence paradigm that I describe here is grounded in the
moral dimensions of Freeman's perpetrator perspective. Freeman
himself acknowledged the influence of white innocence in equal
protection doctrine.15 0 Because equal protection's framework focuses
on principles of "fault," "guilt," and harm that is "caused" by discrete
parties,15 1 blame-and the absence of blame-are its defining features.
Freeman contended that equal protection's preoccupation with blame
and fault leads to a "complacency about one's own moral status" and
"creates a class of 'innocents,' who need not feel any personal
responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination."1 5 2
Consequently, whites "feel great resentment when called upon to bear
any burdens in connection with remedying violations" that are not of
their own making. 153 The innocence framework, therefore, is the moral
byproduct of a perspective that emphasizes individual wrongdoing.
The perpetrator perspective in equal protection, and innocence
as its moral companion, surfaced in a number of early cases that
foreshadowed later attacks on affirmative action and Justice Powell's
decisive opinion in Bakke. In Washington v. Davis, for example, the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a civil service exam
that disadvantaged blacks applying to become police officers in the
District of Columbia. 154 The Davis Court concluded that intentional
discrimination, rather than disproportionate adverse racial impact,

146. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that school segregation
that is no longer traceable to intentional discrimination lies outside federal court jurisdiction).
147. Freeman, supra note 34 at 1054.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1055 ("The fault concept ... creates a class of 'innocents,' who need not feel any
personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel
great resentment when called upon to bear any burdens in connection with remedying
violations.").
151. Id. at 1054.
152. Id. at 1055.
153. Id.
154. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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defined equal protection claims. 155 Significantly, this meant that the
Court would not recognize racial disparities-or as Freeman put it,
"the objective conditions of life"1 6-as the basis for an equal protection
challenge. In so doing, Davis laid the foundation for equal protection's
eventual undoing as an avenue for affirmative claims by racial
minorities that sought to dismantle systemic racial disadvantage.15 7
Still, Davis left open the possibility that "intent" could be
defined in equal protection terms as the foreseeable consequences of
one's actions. 1568 Pursuing policies that had a predictable racially
disparate outcome, therefore, could be constitutionally cognizable.
According to this interpretation of equal protection, "intent" included
an "awareness" of the likelihood of adverse impact.1 5 9
However, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, the Court eliminated this theory of intent, defining
"discriminatory purpose" as a decision to "select[] or reaffirm[] a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."16 0 This
principle would be reinforced later by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp,
which rejected an equal protection claim by a black capital defendant
in Georgia who argued that the pervasive influence of race on death
sentences in the state tainted his own death sentence. 161 Although the
study suggested a strong correlation between race and the imposition
of death sentences generally, the Court concluded that the defendant
had failed to establish that race played a dispositive role in his case in
particular. 162
Davis, Feeney, and McCleskey joined a long list of equal
protection cases that embraced, even if only implicitly, the perpetrator
perspective and its "atomistic" 163 understanding of racial harm. Each
of these cases can be understood to manifest a concern that innocent
whites would be blamed (wrongly) for conditions for which they were
155. Freeman, supra note 34, at 1055.
156. Id. at 1052.
157. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1133-34 (1997) (describing Davis's role in
erecting barrier to actions challenging "facially neutral state action").
158. Id. at 1134 (observing that it was not until Feeney that "the Court made clear that it
had raised quite a formidable barrier to plaintiffs challenging facially neutral state action").
159. Id. (describing plaintiffs theory in Feeney that foreseeability of disparate impact
constituted intent for purposes of equal protection).
160. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
161. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
162. Id. at 292-93 (observing that McCleskey had "offer[ed] no evidence specific to his own
case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence").
163. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 1054.
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not responsible. As a matter of equal protection, Davis in particular
may have benefited from
eroded the idea that whites
intergenerational advantage and the resulting systems of racial
hierarchy. The constitutional consequences were profound as the
historical impact of racial discrimination was erased from the equal
protection calculus. In practical terms, this meant that persistent,
widespread racial disadvantage was constitutionally invisible, as were
the disempowered racial minorities who suffered from it. As Bakke
would come to demonstrate, equal protection not only failed to protect
persons of color from the "objective conditions of life"164 but also
became a sword against the very policies that sought to redress these
conditions in the absence of provable intentional discrimination.16 5
Bakke instigated this shift through "colorblind" reasoning that treated
racial classifications themselves as presumptively harmful under
equal protection, disregarding the systemic racial disadvantage that
gave rise to affirmative action in the first place. 6 6
2. White Resentment as Racial Injury
Equal protection doctrine both reflects and produces our social
narratives about race, as well as our public tolerance of policies that
promote racial inclusion.1 6 7 The previous Section explored this idea
through the lens of the perpetrator perspective. Equal protection's
focus on individual fault and blame-and innocence, as their
corollary-largely placed racial disadvantage as a cognizable harm
beyond the constitutional conversation. However, this doctrinal shift
also mirrored social and cultural norms that were increasingly
intolerant of public programs designed to alleviate racial
disadvantage.1 6 8

As already noted, after Davis, Feeney, and McCleskey, racial
disparities alone were not sufficient to maintain a cause of action
under the Equal Protection Clause. Nonetheless, these cases left room
for the possibility that state actors could voluntarily seek to remedy
widespread racial disadvantage through their own affirmative uses of
race. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the first

164. Id.
165. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (rejecting "societal
discrimination" as a constitutional justification for affirmative action).
166. See Ian Haney L6pez, IntentionalBlindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
167. See POST, supra note 42, at 22; Freeman, supra note 34, at 1051 (noting the role that
law plays as "an evolving statement of acceptable public morality").
168. See DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE
EQUALITY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2012).
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Supreme Court case to address the constitutionality of voluntary raceconscious policies, 16 9 however, struck a crippling blow against
affirmative action. In so doing, it put the innocence paradigm on full
display. Much has been written about Bakke,1 70 but its role in
redefining the racial harm to white plaintiffs and presumed
wrongdoing by government defendants in affirmative action cases

tends to get lost.171
Allan Bakke challenged the University of California at Davis
Medical School's two-track admissions process, one track for general
admissions and a separate track for "disadvantaged" students that
reserved a fixed number of seats in the entering class of one
hundred.1 72 His application was reviewed and denied under the
general admissions track.173 The Court struck down the program, and,
in so doing, determined that Bakke was entitled to an injunction
directing his admission. 7 4 However, the Court concluded, critically,
that the relevant injury for standing purposes was not Bakke's
rejection from the medical school but his inability to compete for every
seat in the class.175 Framing his injury this way allowed the Court to
duck the ongoing debate in the case about whether the university's
consideration of race was in fact the reason why Bakke had been
rejected.1 76 But the Court's decision also had the effect of
reformulating standing doctrine to make it easier for future white
plaintiffs to challenge affirmative action.
Here it is important to understand that Bakke arose in the
context of growing sentiment among whites that they were unjustly
burdened by policies that benefited racial minorities. 177 As Reva Siegel

169. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), was technically the first affirmative action
higher-education case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. Marco DeFunis sued the University of
Washington Law School based on its consideration of race in admissions, but was subsequently
admitted, and the case was later dismissed as moot. Id. at 319-20. However, DeFunis, like
Bakke, appeared to have a questionable basis for challenging the program. The record indicated
that the law school had admitted two hundred applicants and that he had been placed "in the
bottom quartile of a waiting list of 155 applicants." DESLIPPE, supra note 168, at 111.
170. For example, a search of the "Law Reviews and Journals" database on Westlaw with
Bakke in the title yielded sixty-eight articles.
171. But see Haney L6pez, supra note 166 (discussing doctrinal turns in Bakke); Ross, supra
note 28 (discussing role of innocence in Bakke); Equality Talk, supra note 28, at 1529-30
(discussing constitutional impact of shift in judgments about harm to whites).
172. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274-79 (1978).
173. Id. at 277.
174. Id. at 320.
175. Id. at 280 n.14.
176. See Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1465-66.
177. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 1055 (observing "the ferocity surrounding the debate
about so-called 'reverse' discrimination," which resulted from "resentment ... for being called on
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has observed, the burgeoning contest over affirmative action was itself
rooted in "racial conflict"1 78 about the very meaning of equality, which
could be traced in turn to debates over the implementation of Brown v.
Board of Education.79 This conflict "shaped the path and form" of
Justice Powell's opinion,180 which created a presumption that racial
considerations victimized innocent whites as a matter of constitutional
doctrine. In so doing, Powell's opinion obscured the historical
subordination of African Americans.' 8 1 Although earlier equal
protection cases had planted the seeds of the innocence paradigm,1 82
Powell's analysis set the stage for even more consequential shifts in
equal protection that reflected and reinforced an expansive
interpretation of white racial injury.1 83 The assumption that innocent
whites were unfairly disadvantaged by-and, therefore, resentful ofaffirmative uses of race by the state (arguably) was as pernicious as
the constitutional rule that had disadvantaged minority litigants in
Washington v. Davis, among other cases. After Powell's opinion in
Bakke took root, equal protection shed any pretense of shielding
people of color against racial disadvantage and became a sword
against state efforts to promote minority opportunity.1 84 Equal
protection doctrine achieved this outcome by explicitly seeking to
protect white litigants against affirmative action, including, as
discussed further below, through broad interpretations of standing

to bear burdens ordinarily imposed only upon the guilty"). See generally DESLIPPE, supra note
168.
178. See Equality Talk, supra note 28, at 1477.
179. Id. at 1514 (observing that the "presumption against racial classifications began to
shift by the end of the 1960s, in response to escalating national conflicts over race and the rise of
a new generation of desegregation initiatives aimed at post-secondary and professional
education").
180. Id. at 1477.
181. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-92 (1978) (dismissing
the Court's initial antisubordination understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
focused on guarding "the freedom of the slave race" (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
71 (1873))), with id. at 294 (observing that although the "landmark [equal protection] decisions
arose in response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American
society," they need not be confined to that initial reading).
182. See generally Freeman, supra note 34, at 1054-57 (discussing the perpetrator
perspective in Supreme Court equal protection decisions).
183. Powell's opinion did not command a majority, but it would eventually become the 'law
of the land." Paul R. Baier, Of Bakke's Balance, Gratz, and Grutter: The Voice of Justice Powell,
78 TUL. L. REV. 1955, 2007 (2004); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) ("Since
this Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion . . . has served as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies."); Dow, supra note
11, at 1130-34 (discussing the "equal protection doctrine's wrong turn" in Bakke and the
decision's lasting influence).
184. 438 U.S. at 289-311.
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that opened the federal courts to litigants challenging race-conscious
selection policies.
The first doctrinal turn was Powell's conclusion that strict
scrutiny should apply to the university's admissions policy, 186 which
required the university to show that its use of race in admissions was
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.1 86 The university had
urged the Court to adopt a more lenient standard of judicial review
given that one purpose of its admissions program was to address the
effects of "societal discrimination on historically disadvantaged racial
and ethnic minorities."1 8 7 Powell rejected the argument, concluding
that "racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect"
and "call for the most exacting judicial examination."18 8 He justified
the more rigorous standard on the grounds that the state's
consideration of race was itself presumptively harmful.1 89 In this
respect, Powell's reasoning was critical. It revealed that his primary
concern was the "deep resentment," discomfort, and "outrage" among
"innocent" whites that resulted from affirmative action. 190 This drove
his conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply to the university's
explicit consideration of race:
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of
race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The
denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so
deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to
find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely
the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by
91
the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. 1

The theme that the university's affirmative action policy harmed
innocent whites surfaced repeatedly throughout Powell's opinion.
Affirmative action burdened whites because the historical wrongs it
sought to address were "not of their making,"19 2 which in turn led to a
"perception of mistreatment." 193 Powell refused to apply a lower

185. Id. at 288, 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
186. Id. at 305.
187. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, 12, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977) (No. 76-811), 1977 WKL
189474, at *3, *12; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88.

188. 438 U.S. at 291.
189. Id. at 299 ("When [admissions policies] touch upon an individual's race or ethnic
background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that
basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.").
190. Id. at 294 n.34.

191. Id.
192. Id. at 298.
193. Id. at 294 n.34.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

328

[Vol. 68:2:297

standard of scrutiny for affirmative action policies given the risk that
it would "exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than
alleviate them."1

94

Powell's determination to frame Bakke as an innocent white
victim of the university's policy was also pivotal to another important
question before the Court: whether the university's goal of remedying
"the enduring effects of racial discrimination" against racial minorities
was a constitutionally compelling interest.195 The difficulty was that
this objective could not be easily reconciled with Powell's premise that
affirmative action unfairly harmed whites, since doing so would make
it easier to justify the university's policy.1 96 Therefore, Powell once
again redirected the constitutional narrative to emphasize affirmative
action's
encumbrances
on
whites.' 9 7
Remedying
"societal
discrimination" was too amorphous to justify the burden on persons
like Bakke who bore "no responsibility for whatever harm the
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered."19 8 The justification for such a program required more from
the university than some abstract goal of redressing racial inequality.
Instead, it had to be based upon "judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. "'99
Only an interest in vindicating "the legal rights" of racial minorities
based on intentional racial wrongdoing by whites could rationalize
remedial considerations in admissions. 200 Limiting the use of racial
classifications to a narrow remedial context would "assure" "the least
harm possible to other innocent persons." 20 1 Thus, white guilt,
culpability, and innocence were central to Powell's analysis.
And yet, Powell's analysis depended on a racial asymmetry of
innocence. He dismissed the possibility that "innocent" racial
minorities were burdened by the effects of longstanding racial

194. Id. at 298-99.
195. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 187, at 32.
196. 438 U.S. at 307 ("We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived
as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.").
197. Id.
198. Id. at 310. Ironically, Powell rejected the de jure-de facto distinction in Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 232 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). In Keyes, Powell called for a
national constitutional standard that would impose an "affirmative duty" on school districts to
address segregated conditions, regardless of their origin. Id. at 224.
199. 438 U.S. at 307.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 308.
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discrimination. 2 0 2 Powell's

refusal to acknowledge these racial
disparities, of course, was facilitated by Washington v. Davis, which
made pervasive racial disadvantage virtually invisible to the equal
protection calculus. 203 Notably, he also sidestepped the possibility that
Bakke and his white peers may have benefited from prior systems of
de jure discrimination, including artificially limited applicant pools
that included relatively few minorities due to the intergenerational
effects of segregated schooling.2 0 4 Hence, Powell's focus on innocence
pointedly prioritized white innocence, while denying racial minorities
the same presumption. As discussed in Part III below, this asymmetry
of innocence would surface later as white plaintiffs in equal protection
cases enjoyed expansive interpretations of standing that would be
denied to minority plaintiffs.
Powell's tighter remedial standard made it harder for
institutions that practiced affirmative action to justify their policies. 205
But it also created a paradigm in which the presumed burdens of
affirmative action on innocent whites became a primary focus of equal
protection. Powell accomplished this in part by couching equal
protection's guarantee in "personal" terms that focused on
"individuals," rather than groups. 2 06 With its rejection of group-based
racial disadvantage as a legitimate constitutional concern, 207 equal
protection shifted to a thinner and more formalistic conception of
racial equality.2 0 8 The relevant harm was not the underlying systemic
disadvantage to racial minorities as a result of longstanding
discrimination. 2 0 9 Rather what mattered was the injury to whites that
ostensibly resulted from the explicit use of race to make admissions
decisions. 2 10 This reframing of the relevant injury focused the
202. Id. at 310.
203. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); cf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (noting that adverse racial impact is "starting point" for an
intent analysis).
204. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
205. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the University of
Texas's remedial rationale as justification for its consideration of race in admissions); see also
Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 179
n.22 (2005) (discussing challenges of remedial rationale in higher education).
206. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
207. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240-41.
208. See generally Freeman, supra note 34, at 1054-57 (introducing this shift in Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
209. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310; Freeman, supra note 34, at 1054-57.
210. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310:
[The purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School
perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that
imposes disadvantages upon persons like [Bakke], who bear no responsibility for
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constitutional inquiry on the presumed harm of racial classifications
themselves, leading to the "colorblindness" rationale that has become
so prevalent in equal protection doctrine. 211 By embracing a
framework that emphasized individual treatment rather than groupbased inequality, 212 Powell eliminated the historical context that gave
life and meaning to the university's admissions policy. Thus, Allan
Bakke shifted from being a beneficiary of accumulated white racial
status and advantage, as the university had argued, to being an
innocent victim.
Ironically, the very group formulation that Powell had rejected
on behalf of racial minorities (i.e., that their systemic disadvantage
justified the explicit use of race in higher education admissions) had
come to roost in equal protection doctrine in another form. Powell's
reframing of the equal protection inquiry allowed him to generalize
Bakke's experience, as a white person individually burdened by
affirmative action, to whites as a group. 2 13 Indeed, Powell couched his
concern explicitly in group terms. 214 His conclusion that white
"outrage" and "resentment" undermined the university policy itself
rested on a racial stereotype that contradicted his professed concern
about treating people as individuals. 215 Yet it enabled Powell to
reformulate equal protection in a way that could vindicate whites who
were generally aggrieved by affirmative action. This reformulation
included the application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious policies,
the rejection of the university's broad remedial goals, and, as we shall
see in Part III below, an aggressive interpretation of standing for
Bakke himself that broadened standing doctrine for white litigants
more generally.
3. Whites as a Subordinated Group
As discussed in the previous section, Bakke cultivated a
narrative of white victimhood that has become the default framework
for equal protection and race. 216 This narrative starts with the
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered.
211. See generally Haney L6pez, supra note 166, at 1825-33 (discussing Powell's
introduction of "contemporary colorblind reasoning" in Bakke and its continuance in the cases
that followed).
212. Id. at 1827.
213. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Gratz, supra note 18 (illustrating the mentality of white victimhood). But see
Steven Mazie, Why Affirmative Action Isn't to Blame for Your College Rejection Letter,

2015]

THE SINS OF INNOCENCE

331

presumption that race-conscious policies unjustly injure whites as a
group. 217 Yet Powell's ability to elevate "white innocence" as a
constitutional concern depended on complicating the very notion of
"whiteness."218 This, in turn, involved disrupting assumptions about
the dominant majority status of whites and the corresponding socially
diminished status of racial minorities. 219 Under Powell's reformulated
equal protection framework, whites were also a subordinated
"minority" group. 220
This move was crucial to Powell's conclusion that strict
scrutiny should apply to government considerations of race that
benefited, as well as burdened, historically subordinated racial
minority groups. 22 1 As Ian Haney L6pez has observed, to achieve this,
Powell needed to blur the distinction between social legislation that
burdened "vulnerable minorities"-and, therefore, required more
rigorous judicial review-and "ordinary" legislation that called for
judicial deference. 222 But to accomplish this, Powell first had to
challenge the premise that racial minorities alone were burdened by
historical wrongs and to debunk the notion that the primary purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect them as a group. 223

BIGTHINK.COM (April 17, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://bigthink.com/praxis/why-affirmative-action-isntto-blame-for-your-rejection-letter, archived at http://perma.cc/G4NS-FUDQ (explaining that
eliminating affirmative action would have little to no effect on "white candidates' chances of
admission"); Krystie Yandolie, An Open Letter to Affirmative Action Reject Abigail Fisher,
JEZEBEL.COM (June 25, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/an-open-letter-to-affirmative-actionreject-abigail-fis-570774253, archived at http://perma.cc/K4R3-FK6M (criticizing the plaintiff in
Fisherv. Univ. of Texas for challenging affirmative action and ignoring her "white privilege").
217. See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination,Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 118-20 (2010) (discussing innocence
claims of white reverse discrimination plaintiff in Title VII case and his efforts to "reposition[]
whites as racially subordinated and disempowered").
218. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 ("[T]he white 'majority' itself is composed of various
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of
the State and private individuals.").
219. Id. (observing that "[t]he concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect
temporary arrangements and political judgments").
220. Id.
221. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1034-35 (2007).
222. Id. This has also been described as a principle of "equivalence." Id. at 985, 987, 1016;
see also Michelle Adams, Is Integration a DiscriminatoryPurpose?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 837, 841-44
(2011) (discussing "equivalence" rationale).
223. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291-95 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment's original focus on
the protection of the "slave race" and the shift away from a tiered theory of equal protection); id.
at 295 ("It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded
others."); id. ("The clock of our liberties . . . cannot be turned back to 1868.").
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As L6pez has explained, "[e]thnicity provided Powell's
answer." 224 Powell introduced a "revised narrative" that shifted from
the historical origins and context of the Fourteenth Amendment, with
its focus on African Americans, to the "nation of minorities" that had
emerged during the twentieth century. 225 Powell argued that equal
protection long had been applied equally to white ethnic and religious
groups, including "Celtic Irishmen," "Austrian resident aliens," 226
people of "Eastern, Middle, and Southern European ancestry, such as
Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic Groups." 2 2 7 By
scrupulously avoiding any mention of blacks and by referencing other
nonwhites by their country of origin, 228 Powell unraveled equal
protection's historical focus on African Americans and other racial
minorities. 229 In so doing, he also sought to unravel the very
understanding of "minority" itself. 23 0 As Powell observed, many
groups, including white ethnics, had been subjected to discrimination:
Each had to struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not
of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of
whom it was said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a
23 1
willingness to disadvantage other groups.

In essence, because so many groups could claim minority status and
historical disadvantage, these criteria alone contributed little to the
equal protection framework. 232 This redefinition of "minority" allowed
Powell to contest the significance of the minority status of racially
marginalized groups.23 3 If there was no dominant white majority, then
there could be no disadvantaged racial minority. 234
For Powell, the m6lange of racial and ethnic groups that could
claim minority status pointed to a judicial quandary. 235 The Court
224. Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1035; see also id. at 1029-43 (discussing Powell's use
of ethnicity in Bakke).
225. Id. at 1035.
226. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292.
227. Id. at 292 n.32 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.1(b) (1977)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 292.
230. Id. at 292, 295 (observing that "[t]he concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily
reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments" and describing the "white 'majority'"
as being "composed of various minority groups").
231. Id. at 292.
232. Id. at 295-96.
233. Id. at 295-97.
234. Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 34, at 1066 (discussing equal protection's role in
"abstracting racial discrimination into a myth-world where all problems of race or ethnicity are
fungible").
235. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-97 (discussing lack of a "principled basis for deciding which
groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not").
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would be unable to properly distinguish between majority and
minority groups. 236 Having put white ethnic groups and racial
minorities on an equal constitutional plane, because each had suffered
their own brand of prejudice and discrimination, the terms "majority"
and "minority" were divested of racial meaning and associated
connotations of power and dominance. 237 Because "the white 'majority'
itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay
claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and
private individuals," Powell reasoned that it would be impossible to
draw principled distinctions to determine which group "merit [ed]
heightened judicial solicitude and which would not." 2 3 8 Powell
concluded that the very notion of majority and minority groups
"necessarily reflect[ed] temporary arrangements and political
judgments," which were subject to change based on shifting political
alliances. 239 Accordingly, Powell rejected any notion that racial
minorities were burdened by systemic disadvantage of an entirely
different kind and degree. 240
By bringing white ethnic groups into a constitutional narrative
that had centered previously on the experiences of racial minorities,
Powell changed the terms of the constitutional debate. 241 But the shift
in equal protection doctrine also helped fuel a social and cultural
narrative of white victimhood that laid the blame for minorities'
depressed status at their feet. 2 4 2 The history, experience, and
assimiliationist success of white ethnic groups suggested to Powell
that "race" itself was less of a social problem than racial minorities'
"group culture." 2 4 3 Indeed, Powell leveraged the achievements of white

ethnic groups to suggest that the bigger threat posed to racial
minorities by affirmative action was that it could "reinforce common

236. Id. at 295-97.
237. Id. at 296, 297 & n.37.
238. Id. at 295-96; Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1037-38.
239. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
240. See Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1038.
241. See id. at 1029-43.
242. See id. at 1022-25 (noting the symbiotic relationship between the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence and the advent of race-as-ethnicity theory in the late 1970s and early
1980s); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 'Color Blindness' Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 103 & n.92 (2000)
(describing the use of a "race-as-ethnicity" narrative that combined "individualism" and
"culturally potent narratives about the immigrant's struggle from rags-to-riches that played an
important role in redefining the sociopolitical salience of color blindness discourse in politics and
law"); see also DESLIPPE, supra note 168, at 180-208 (describing cultural and political reactions
of the white majority to affirmative action).
243. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-96; see Siegel, supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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stereotypes" that they "are unable to achieve success without special
protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth." 2 4 4 Coupled with a framework of individualism, Powell's focus
on white ethnic groups facilitated his conclusion that the same level of
scrutiny should apply to policies that both benefited racial minorities
and disadvantaged whites. 245 Innocence again operated as a subtext.
Because different white ethnic groups too had been subjected to
discrimination, they were all in some measure "innocent" victims.

24 6

It

was not possible, therefore, to distinguish the level of judicial scrutiny
that applied to white applicants like Bakke from the level of scrutiny
that applied to racial minorities. 247 Any consideration of race was
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of whose "ox [was being] gored." 248
Powell's move was clever. 249 By elevating a constitutional
narrative of discrimination that "disaggregate[ed] whites" into
individual ethnic groups, he could deny that whites enjoyed "group"
power and status. 250 However, he then used this same narrative to
cast whites collectively as victims of affirmative action, applying a
standard of heightened judicial review that disemboweled the
remedial objectives of the university's admissions policy 251 and set the
stage for consequential turns in equal protection that embraced
"colorblindness" as a core, animating principle. 252 The presumptive
illegitimacy of affirmative action was that it failed to acknowledge the
varied ethnic subtexts of whiteness and, in so doing, unjustly
subordinated whites as a group. 2 5 3 By sleight of hand, Powell had
created a narrative that whites suffered "group-based disadvantage"
from affirmative action, while erasing from the equal protection

244. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
245. See Siegel, supra note 242, at 103 (observing the role that the "race-as-ethnicity story"
played in "redefining the sociopolitical salience of color blindness discourse in politics and law").
This laid the foundation for the majority opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson, which
determined that strict scrutiny applies regardless whether the racial classification burdens or
benefits racial minorities. 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
246. See DESLIPPE, supra note 168, at 206-08.
247. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-96.
248. Id. at 295 n.35 (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975));
see also Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1036 (criticizing Justice Powell's use of this language as
reflecting a lack of both understanding and sympathy for the "iniquitous reality confronting
blacks").
249. Powell's turn here was even more remarkable given that in earlier parts of his opinion
he had elaborated on the historical "evils of segregation" in addressing the history and purpose of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284-87.
250. Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1039.
251. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-11.
252. See Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 1021-47.
253. Id.
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framework the persistent group subordination of racial minorities that
affirmative action sought to address. 254 This reformulated narrative
placed aggrieved whites as a group at the center of the equal
protection inquiry while diminishing the significance of continuing
disadvantage of racial minorities as a constitutional concern. Powell
formally couched his equality narrative in individualistic terms, 25 5 but
he deployed innocence norms to protect the group status of whites. 256
4. The Acceptability of Diversity
One interest asserted by the university, however, was
consistent with Powell's project of managing white anxiety about
affirmative action. Powell concluded that the "attainment of a diverse
student body" was "clearly" a "constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education." 257 Diversity satisfied his innocence
concerns because it expressly contemplated that the race of white
applicants could be favorably considered under a diversity-oriented
admissions policy.258 Diversity also would produce educational benefits
that could help white students. The fact that race would be one of
many different factors based on an individualized evaluation of each
applicant was consistent with Powell's interpretation of the equal
protection guarantee 259 and his selective brand of individualism. 2 6 0
Further, it aligned with the innocence paradigm because it did not
depend on historical evidence of past or contjnuing discrimination by
whites against marginalized racial groups. 26 1
Powell's rejection of the university's remedial objective and
acceptance of diversity as a rationale weaves together the elements
that define the innocence paradigm. Both emphasized the burdens on

254. See id. at 1039-40 ("But in considering the position of the 'white "majority,"' Powell
moved back toward a concern with specifically group-based disadvantage.").
255. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 ("If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection
against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a
particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently.").
256. See id. at 294 n.34 (suggesting "state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens
and benefits on the basis of race" would elicit "deep resentment" and "outrage" among "innocent
persons"); id. at 298 (referring to "a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in [Bakke's]
position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making").
257. Id. at 311-12.
258. Justice Powell contemplated that a black student could contribute to the experience of
diversity, just like a "farm boy from Idaho" or an Italian-American. Id. at 316-17 (quoting
Appendix to the Brief for Columbia University et al. as Amici Curiae 2-3, id. (No. 76-811)).
259. Id. at 318.
260. Id. at 315-20.
261. Id.
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individual white applicants as a constitutional concern that eclipsed
broader remedial social goals. Both also allowed Powell to avoid a
historical framework that would contextualize racial disadvantage as
a system that has existed across time. Powell's remedial frame
rejected a broad historical vantage point and instead focused on
identifiable discrimination that could be traced to a government
actor. 262 "Societal discrimination," by definition was too amorphous
and diffuse to justify racial considerations, and Powell disparaged the
university policy as being "ageless in its reach into the past." 2 6 3
Diversity, on the other hand, had a limited historical valence. The
practical power of diversity, of course, lay in its acknowledgement of
the racial exclusion that had led to isolated, all-white institutions. 2 6 4
But it quite clearly disclaimed a remedial objective 265 and tended to
focus instead on the educational advantages that inured to the benefit
of all students, including whites. 266 As a result, it satisfied the terms
of the innocence paradigm.
5. Innocence as a Racial Motivation
As discussed in the previous sections, Powell's use of innocence
was explicitly racially motivated. His Bakke opinion created a
constitutional architecture that was oriented toward managing white
resentment of affirmative action and instantiated white victimization
as a primary focus of equal protection in affirmative action cases. 267
Powell's explicit invocation of white innocence set the stage for a
series of cataclysmic shifts in equal protection that privileged white
plaintiffs challenging race-conscious government policies. As a result,
it imposed a strict standard of review even for policies that had a
benign, inclusionary motive and rejected state efforts to redress
pervasive racial disadvantage as being constitutionally illegitimate. 268
Only more narrowly circumscribed remedial justifications that were
traceable to intentional discrimination-and could be judicially
managed to ensure the least encumbrance on white interests-would

262. Id. at 307-09.
263. Id. at 307.
264. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003) (observing that "our Nation's struggle
with racial inequality" increases the importance of diversity in educational settings).
265. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10.
266. Id. at 311-15.
267. See Haney L6pez, supra note 166, at 1826-27; Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 103437.
268. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989).
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suffice. 269 His primary concern was to mitigate white resentment of
affirmative action policies and the threat they posed to whites as a
group. 270
Powell's doctrinal moves gave not only white persons but also
whiteness itself normative power. His constitutional framework
elevated whiteness to a special favored status in equal protection, 2 7 1
contradicting
equal protection's
own
professed
norms
of
nondiscrimination. 272 Since Bakke, equal protection has operated
pursuant to a racial double standard: it calls for racial neutrality but
for reasons that are explicitly racially motivated. 273 It is highly
attentive to white racial attitudeS 274 but disregards pervasive
discrimination that disadvantages racial minorities. 275 If the
innocence paradigm itself was subject to constitutional scrutiny, it
likely would fail as it favors whites "for no reason other than race,"
simply for "its own sake." 2 7 6

and

And yet innocence is an enduring feature of equal protection
surfaces repeatedly in challenges to affirmative action.2 77

269. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08 (observing that "the remedial action usually remains subject
to continuing oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent
persons competing for the benefit').
270. See id. at 318-20 (finding that the admissions policy at issue involved "the use of an
explicit racial classification never before countenanced by [the] Court" because it denied
nonminority applicants "the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the
special admissions seats").
271. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1770-73 (1993)
(noting Bakke's expectation "that he would never be disfavored when competing with minority
candidates, although he might be disfavored with respect to other more privileged whites"); cf.
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM

IDENTITY POLITICS 37 (1998) (arguing that Powell's opinion was rooted in a concern that "white
individuals might be so upset by what they viewed as preferential treatment for Chicanos and
blacks that they might perceive a denial of equal rights amounting to invidious discrimination").
272. See Spann, supra note 10, at 1424 ("[T]he racially correlated outcomes of the [standing]
cases suggest that if the Supreme Court's racial discrimination standards were applicable to the
Court's treatment of standing, the Supreme Court's standing decisions would violate its own
nondiscrimination norms."); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997)
("Current affirmative action law may be the first instance in our jurisprudence of a constitutional
doctrine unconstitutional under itself.").
273. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34 (discussing white "resentment" and "outrage" resulting
from affirmative action); id. at 298 (observing the "measure of inequity in forcing innocent
persons in [Bakke's] position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.").
274. Id. at 298.
275. Id. at 310 (rejecting "societal discrimination" as constitutionally legitimate basis for
affirmative action).
276. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424 (2013) ("Preferring members of any
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This
the Constitution forbids." (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307)).
277. The innocence paradigm is not limited to equal protection. In a Title VII case, United
Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme Court upheld a collective bargaining agreement that
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Following Bakke, the Court invoked innocence concerns in expressly
racial terms in evaluating the constitutionality of race-conscious
policies. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, for example, the
Court struck down a layoff provision in a collective bargaining
agreement that provided advantages for minority teachers ahead of
more senior whites. 278 Even though the provision had been negotiated
by a predominantly white union, Powell asserted that the layoffs
imposed too costly a burden on "innocent" white employees.2 79
Conversely, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court upheld a minority
contracting program after determining that its impact on whites was
tolerably low. 2 80

In more recent cases, innocence has surfaced less directly, but
it is still part of equal protection's operating system. In particular,
innocence frames constitutional determinations that a policy is
narrowly tailored by ensuring that it does not "unduly burden"
innocent "third parties." 281 As indicated in Wygant and Fullilove,
courts evaluate whether race-conscious policies exact too high a cost
on whites-if not, they are upheld 282; if so, they are struck down. 2 83
Indeed, even policies that affect relatively few whites are at risk. In
considered race in order to eradicate "old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" in job
categories that had been "traditionally segregated." 443 U.S. 193, 208-09. Although the
agreement reserved a certain percentage of slots for black employees in a new training program
in order to "eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in [the defendant's] almost exclusively white
[workforce]," id. at 198, the Court determined that it did not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees," id. at 208. The key was that the plan did not require layoffs of
white workers. Further it did not absolutely bar the advancement of white workers "since half of
those trained in the program" would be white. Id.
278. 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986).
279. Id. at 270, 283 ("[L]ayoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on
particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden is too
intrusive."); see also Sullivan, supra note 20, at 86-96 (discussing innocence themes in Supreme
Court cases, including Wygant).
280. 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) ("When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not
impermissible."), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235
(1995).
281. The goal of narrow tailoring is to ensure that persons who are "disfavored" by racial
considerations are not "unduly burden[ed]." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003)
("Narrow tailoring, therefore, requires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly
harm members of any racial group."). Innocence figures prominently in this analysis. For
example, racial classifications that are used to remedy past discrimination must be narrowly
drawn to ensure that they impose the "least harm possible to other innocent persons competing
for the benefit." Id.; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182-83 (1987) (invoking
themes of white innocence). University admissions programs that rely on race must be similarly
tailored for the same reason. See Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306.
282. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
283. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84; see also Sullivan, supra note 20, at 86-96 (discussing
innocence themes in Supreme Court cases, including Wygant).
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Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle, for example, the
Court struck down the use of race in school district assignment
policies in part because of their "minimal effect" on white students. 284
Perversely, the Court concluded that the policies' slight impact showed
that race was not "necessary" to achieve the districts' goal of having
racially integrated and diverse student bodies. 28 5 The cost of white
resentment was too high to justify even de minimis racial
considerations. 286
Innocence concerns also underlie the constitutional inquiry into
the legitimacy of state interests that support affirmative action. In
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court rejected a
minority contracting program that sought to remedy racial disparities
in Richmond's local contracting industry that were not traceable to
intentional discrimination. 2 8 7 Following Powell's lead in Bakke, the
Court concluded that affirmative action was permissible if used to
redress specific racial wrongdoing by whites but could not be deployed
to remedy general racial disadvantage.28 8 This echoed Powell's concern
that whites as a group would be denied government benefits as a
result of widespread racial disparities for which they were not
individually responsible. 289 Similarly, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, the Court concluded that strict scrutiny applied to federal, as
well as state and local, affirmative action policies. 290 Again, as in
Bakke, the Court dismissed any notion that racially inclusionary
motives justified a lower standard of review. 291 Finally, the acceptance
of diversity, most prominently reflected in the Supreme Court's
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger292 and even, most recently, in Fisher
itself, also bears the imprint of Powell's handiwork. 293 Thus, white

284. 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007).
285. Id.
286. See id. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring).
287. 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989).
288. Id. at 496-97, 506.
289. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1978) (observing that a
"remedial action" based on "identified discrimination" is more likely to "work the least harm
possible to other innocent persons").
290. 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
291. Id. at 226. Innocence also surfaced in school desegregation cases in which the Court
rejected the use of racial classifications to redress racial imbalance that originated in "innocent
private decisions, involving voluntary housing choices." Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750
(Thomas, J., concurring).
292. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
293. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-18 (embracing Powell's conception of
diversity).
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guilt, culpability, and innocence dominate the equal protection
query.2 94
The innocence paradigm has informed the constitutional
structure of affirmative action for decades. 29 5 The substantive and
procedural impact of this paradigm is evident throughout equal
protection, with rules that are now familiar staples of the doctrine. As
discussed, these rules include the application of strict scrutiny even to
benign considerations of race and the severely constrained range of
constitutional interests that justify racial classifications. 29 6 As
elaborated below, the innocence paradigm also explains the expansive
turns in standing rules that have privileged white plaintiffs contesting
race-conscious government policies.
III. THE ASYMMETRIES OF INNOCENCE
A. The "DiminishedOpportunity"Principle
In Bakke, there were good reasons to question whether the
university's consideration of race had caused Allan Bakke's rejection.
The program explicitly limited applicants on the basis of class, rather
than race,2 97 and the special admissions program did not exclude
disadvantaged whites from consideration. 298 Bakke had not applied to
the program as a disadvantaged applicant, 299 a point that led the trial
court judge to question the strength of his injury and whether he was
the right candidate to challenge the UC Davis policy. 300 Powell,
however, was not persuaded.3 0 1 Disadvantaged whites had applied to
the program "in large numbers," but none had been admitted through

294. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 1054-57.
295. See Dow, supra note 11, at 1131 ('The standard of review debate begun in Bakke
continued through the major affirmative action cases of the 1980s."). As already discussed,
Bakke's influence is evident throughout modern affirmative action cases. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S.
Ct. at 2415 (discussing the standard of review for race-conscious admissions established in
Bakke).
296. See supra Part II.C.
297. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 & n.1 (1978).
298. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective
Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2002) ("[T]here is . . . no basis for believing that
Bakke was excluded from the special program based on his race as opposed to his lack of
disadvantage.").
299. 438 U.S. at 280 n.14.
300. See Liu, supra note 298, at 1055.
301. 438 U.S. at 276 ("Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in
large numbers, none received an offer of admission through that process."); id. (noting that the
special admissions committee convened at one point "considered only 'disadvantaged' special
applicants who were members of one of the designated minority groups").
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that process, 30 2 which suggested to him that the "disadvantage"
criterion was really a pretext for race.3 03 Indeed, Powell remarked that
in the second year that Bakke was considered, the admissions
committee for the special program "explicitly considered only
'disadvantaged' special applicants who were members of one of the
designated minority groups."3 0 4
Still, the notion that considerations of race affected Bakke's
rejection suffers from what Goodwin Liu has described as the
"causation fallacy" in affirmative action cases.30 Bakke assumed that
the special admissions program caused his rejection because racial
minorities with grade point averages, standardized test scores, and
overall ratings lower than his had been admitted.3 0 6 But this
assumption was based on a mathematical error that attributed his
rejection to the magnitude of minority applicants' advantage under
the special admissions process. 3 0 7 In fact, the relatively small size of
the minority applicant pool, combined with the use of subjective
criteria to weed out the large numbers of applicants, meant that race
itself had very little to do with Bakke's outcome. 308 Indeed, putting to
one side his distinguishing characteristics, the special program
increased the chances of his rejection by an infinitesimally small
amount, from 96.8% to 97.3%.309
But there were even more fundamental problems with Bakke's
standing to litigate the constitutionality of the special admissions
program, reflecting critical defects in Bakke's assumption that the
university's use of race was the reason for his rejection. For instance,
there were strong indications that race had made no difference in
Bakke's denial of admission. 3 10 In the trial court, the university
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Liu, supra note 298, at 1046.
306. 438 U.S. at 277.
307. See Liu, supra note 298, at 1074 (observing that "the smallness of the pool of minority
applicants and the relevance of nonobjective criteria in selecting among large numbers of white
applicants conspire to limit the effect on white applicants of substantial preferences for minority
applicants").
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1053-54; see also id. at 1055-56 ("Bakke's exclusion from the special program
was no more a consequence of racial discrimination that it was a consequence of discrimination
on the basis of disadvantage.").
310. Id.; see Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the
Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 368
(2013) ("[J]ust as the Regents could not prove Bakke would be rejected without the program in
place, Bakke could not prove he would have been admitted without it in place. Even without the
program, there was no guarantee that Bakke would have been among the students admitted.").
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contended that Bakke would not have been admitted even if there had
been no special admissions program, suggesting in the strongest
possible terms that race had nothing to do with his rejection. 311 The
trial court's findings of fact accepted the university's conclusion. 3 12
These findings indicated that Bakke had not been put on the alternate
admissions list in either of the years he applied and that few on the
list had even been admitted. 313 Moreover, in the second year Bakke
applied, thirty-two applicants who had been judged more qualified
than him-twenty of whom were alternates-had also been denied
admission. 3 14 Indeed, the chair of the admissions committee testified
that Bakke would have been rejected both years he applied in the
absence of the special program. 315 In light of the record before the trial
court, it seemed plain that Bakke lacked standing. Why then did the
case proceed?
The outcome turned in part on an idiosyncrasy in the litigation
process and what amounted to a decision by the university to concede
standing in order to secure judicial review of its program before the
U.S. Supreme Court.3 1 6 The problem started when the state supreme
court concluded that the trial court had erred in assigning Bakke the
burden of proving that he would have been admitted under a raceneutral proceSS 317 and initially reinanded for further proceedings
consistent with the new allocation of the burden of proof.318 In a move

that would be critically important for the outcome of the case, the
university did not challenge the state supreme court's ruling. 3 19
Instead, in a surprising about-face, the university stipulated in a
petition for rehearing that it would not seek to satisfy the burden of
proof. 32 0 Explaining its decision, the university stated that it had a
''strong interest in obtaining review by the United States Supreme
Court" on the constitutionality of its program and preferred "to obtain
the most authoritative decision possible on the legality of its
admissions process than to argue over whether Mr. Bakke would or

311. Liu, supra note 298, at 1056.
312. Id. at 1056-57 ("The trial court's findings of fact state that in both 1973 and 1974
'[p]laintiff would not have been accepted for admission . . . even if there had been no special
admissions program.' ").

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id. at 1057-58.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279-80 (1978).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 280.
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would not have been admitted" under a race-neutral policy.321 In other
words, the university sought to concede standing because it preferred
certainty to ongoing litigation. 322
With the university having abdicated standing by stipulating
its unwillingness to meet its burden of proof, it was left to interested
amici to press the issue. 323 They argued that Bakke lacked standing
because he had "never show[n] that his injury-exclusion from the
Medical School-[would] be redressed by a favorable decision."3 24 As a
doctrinal matter, there was good reason to suppose that it should have
been Bakke's burden initially to demonstrate that race had been a
motivating factor in the university's decision to reject him.32 5 This has
been the rule in other contexts, where the Court has required
plaintiffs to show a causal link between the defendant's conduct and
the challenged decision.3 26 Moreover, as amici already knew from the
trial record, Bakke would have had difficulty making this showing. 2 7
The standing issue placed Powell in an awkward position.
Although the university had declined to advance a standing argument,
the Court still needed jurisdiction to resolve the case, so simply
ignoring the trial court record (and the hotly contested litigation
around standing up to that point) was not a real option. 328 Powell,
therefore, chose to redefine the injury in a critically important
doctrinal move that would significantly benefit white plaintiffs in later
affirmative action cases for decades to come.329 Bakke's injury was not
the "failure to be admitted,"3 3 0 he concluded, but the inability to
"compete for all 100 places in the class." 33 1 Framing the relevant harm

321. Liu, supra note 298, at 1056 (quoting Petition for Rehearing at 11, Bakke v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976) (No. 23311)).
322. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14 (stating that "[s]everal amici suggest . . . that the
petitioner 'fabricated' jurisdiction").
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citing cases); cf. Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977) ("In other areas of
constitutional law, this Court has found it necessary to formulate a test of causation which
distinguishes between a result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so caused.").
326. Id.
327. See Liu, supra note 298, at 1058 ("As [the amici's] brief makes clear, ample facts were
available to the university to show that Bakke would have been denied admission in 1973 and
1974 even if all sixteen seats in the special program had been available.").
328. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14 (observing that insofar as the amici's "charge" that the
university "'fabricated' jurisdiction" under Article III, that charge "must be considered and
rejected").
329. See infra Part IV.B.
330. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 410; see infra Part IV.B.
331. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14 (emphasis added).
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this way enabled Powell to dodge the potentially fatal defect in
Bakke's claim. 3 2
This move also helped the Court resolve another problem. If
the relevant injury was Bakke's rejection from the university, then
under the causation prong Bakke would have had to show that his
rejection was traceable to the special admissions program. Yet (once
again) this injury would contradict the trial court's findings. 333
Reframing the injury, however,
neutralized
the causation
requirement. Because the harm was the inability to compete for all
spaces in the entering class, an injunction that required Bakke's
admission would necessarily rectify that injury. 334 This maneuver
simultaneously satisfied injury, causation, and redressability and
enabled Bakke to litigate the merits of his constitutional claim. 33 5
For many reasons, Bakke's case was a bad vehicle for deciding
the constitutionality of affirmative action; thus, it is ironic that the
case has had such a critical impact on affirmative action litigation.3 36
The university opened the door for the Court by refusing to argue
standing.337 But the Court's presumption that affirmative action
unjustifiably burdened innocent white applicants undoubtedly
amplified its perception of Bakke's injury.3 38 This presumption again
illustrates the relationship between the substance of equal protection
doctrine and its procedural standards in the standing realm. As
explored more fully in Section B below, the Bakke Court's "diminished
opportunity" principle unleashed an expansive interpretation of
standing that would benefit white plaintiffs in future affirmative

332. See Nichol, supra note 10, at 325 ("[I]f he would not have gained admission anyway,
Bakke's loss was theoretical, like being deprived of an illusion. All he really could assert was the
abstract interest in a government that complied with his vision of equality.").
333. See Liu, supra note 298, at 1056-57.
334. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 203 (1992) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14, and
observing that the Court in Bakke concluded that each standing prong was satisfied "by the
simple doctrinal device of recharacterizingthe injury . .. as involving not admission to medical
school but the opportunity to compete on equal terms"); see also Sunstein, supra note 82, at
1465-66 (observing the dispositive role that the characterization of the injury played in the
Court's standing determination in Bakke).
335. See 438 U.S. at 280 n.14; Sunstein, supra note 334, at 203.
336. See, e.g., Haney L6pez, supra note 221, at 985, 1043-51 (discussing Powell's opinion in
Bakke as a "cornerstone for contemporary colorblind reasoning" evident in subsequent
affirmative action litigation).
337. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 (noting that the university "conceded its inability" to carry the
standing burden).
338. See William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 277, 284 (2013) (discussing role that Powell's relaxation of redressability requirement
played in finding that Bakke had standing).
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action cases.3 39 However, the Court would refuse to apply it in cases
involving claims of racial injury by minority litigants. 340
B. Racially DisparateStanding
The cases discussed below explore the racially disparate
standing outcomes for minority and white plaintiffs. These cases arose
during a period in which the Court narrowed standing doctrine, which
may partly explain the different results. 341 The affirmative action
policies challenged by the white plaintiffs in these cases, of course,
also explicitly relied on racial classifications, which made them more
susceptible to judicial redress than the systemic injuries asserted by
minority litigants.3 42 Nonetheless, the differences in these outcomes
illustrate important features of the innocence paradigm. The Court's
presumption that racial classifications are inherently harmful stems
from the "colorblind" reasoning embedded in the paradigm.3 4 3 The
result is an asymmetry of innocence, in which white plaintiffs who
contest race-conscious policies benefit from presumptions of racial
harm that are not afforded to minority litigants who challenge
systems that have a racially discriminatory impact. 344 The sections
below explore these points further.
1. Minority Plaintiffs
As indicated below, the Court denied standing to minority
plaintiffs based on narrow interpretations of their asserted injury. In
so doing, the Court rejected the framing of global racial injury that it
had relied upon to presume harm from the use of racial classifications
in Bakke. 345 Instead, the Court insisted on a showing of particularized

339. Id. (describing impact of Powell's standing recalibration in relation to Northeastern
Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993)); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995)
(concluding that plaintiff "need not demonstrate that it has been, or will be, the low bidder on a
Government contract. The injury in cases of this kind is that a 'discriminatory classification
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.'" (quoting Ne. Fla., 508 U.S. at 667)).
340. See infra Part III.B.
341. See Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a
Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1864-65 (1996) (observing the "new
and important role" that "generalized grievances" assumed in later years and that "[o]f the
seventeen references to generalized grievances in the Court's history, almost half have come
after 1980").
342. Id. at 1892-98.
343. See supra Part II.C.
344. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
345. See supra Part II.C.3.
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injury. Indeed, precisely because the asserted harms rested on
systemic subordination and disadvantage, the Court concluded that
the claimed injuries were not sufficiently individualized to allow the
plaintiffs to proceed. 346 This was the case even though there was no
question that the minority plaintiffs themselves had been subject to
the very systems that they sought to challenge. 34 7
In Warth v. Seldin, for example, the Court dismissed on
standing grounds a claim by low-income minority residents 348 of
Rochester, New York, against the exclusionary zoning practices of the
adjacent town of Penfield. 349 Plaintiffs argued that Penfield's zoning
laws, which reserved most of its vacant land for single-family homes,
had the "purpose and effect" of excluding low- and moderate-income
persons from the town and sought declaratory and injunctive relief
and damages against members of the zoning, planning, and town
boards. 350
The Court found, based on a narrow interpretation of their
injury, that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek either damages,
injunctive, or declaratory relief. Specifically, plaintiffs had failed to
allege facts that tied their inability to purchase or lease in Penfield to
the defendants' zoning practices, 351 even assuming that defendants
had "contributed, perhaps substantially, to the cost of housing in [the
town]." 3 52 Further, there was no indication that plaintiffs had a
"present interest in any Penfield property," were "subject to the
[Penfield] ordinance's strictures," or had been "denied a variance or
permit by respondent officials." 353 Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
standing inquiry because they had "rel[ied] on little more than the
remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their
situation might have been better had respondents acted otherwise,
and might improve were the court to afford relief." 354 The Court
concluded that "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that such

346. See Spann, supra note 10, at 1461-62 (observing racially disparate application of
standing).
347. See id.
348. Plaintiffs also included taxpayers and an affordable housing organization.
349. 422 U.S. 490, 502-08 (1975).
350. Id. at 495, 515.
351. Id. at 503-04.
352. Id. at 504.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 507.
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practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible
way from the court's intervention." 355
Warth was decided before Bakke, but the Court could have
conceptualized the plaintiffs' injury based on the same "diminished
opportunity" principle. 3 5 6 The plaintiffs' injury boiled down to a simple
premise that the town's policy of reserving most of its land for more
expensive single-family homes made it harder for low-income
minorities to rent or buy locally.3 51 The town's exclusionary zoning

policy, in other words, denied plaintiffs the opportunity to rent or buy,
which (under the logic of Bakke) 358 caused a tangible and personal
harm to them. The Court's requirement that plaintiffs show that they
already had a "concrete" interest in the town's housing from this
perspective was misguided. 359 Plaintiffs had not been able to move into
the town because its housing was expensive,36 0 but an injunction
against the policy plausibly could lower housing costs. Moreover, the
Court's conclusion that the dynamics of the local housing market were
the more likely cause of the plaintiffs' inability to lease or purchase in
the town was itself a merits determination. The Court may ultimately
have been correct, but that could not explain why plaintiffs were not
allowed to prove that the town's zoning policy had distorted the local
housing market in ways that appreciably reduced the supply of lowincome units and undermined their ability to reside in the town.
Two additional cases brought by minority plaintiffs-City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons 361 and Allen v. Wright 362-illUstrate a similarly
narrow interpretation of standing. 363 Once again, the Court in both of
these cases could have relied on the same concept of diminished
opportunity to frame the minority plaintiffs' injury. Instead the Court
relied on an artificially narrow conception of racial injury that denied
355. Id at 508. But see Fletcher, supra note 36, at 275-76 (explaining inconsistency between
Warth and Arlington Heights and arguing that real problem with Warth plaintiffs was that they
could not identify a concrete project, which made their zoning claim more difficult to resolve).
356. As Gene Nichol has observed, Justice Powell's conclusion that Bakke had standing was
particularly surprising given that Powell had authored the majority decision in Warth. Nichol,
supra note 10, at 325 n.117.
357. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning
Ordinances, 89 HARV. L. REV. 189, 189-90 (1975).
358. See supra Part III.A.
359. Id.
360. Warth, 422 U.S. at 496.
361. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
362. 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogatedon other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
363. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 280 (describing the inconsistency between the Court's
conception of injury in Allen v. Wright and an equal protection action filed by a white voter in
Shaw v. Reno).
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minority litigants who challenged systemic racial harms access to the
federal courts.
The Court's decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons is a good example.
Plaintiff Adolph Lyons was a twenty-four-year-old black male who
sought to enjoin the city of Los Angeles from using chokeholds by its
police officers in nonthreatening situations. 364 Los Angeles police had
used the chokehold against Lyons on a vehicle stop, even though he
had neither resisted nor provoked the officers. 365 In his request for
injunctive relief, Lyons alleged that the police "regularly and
routinely" used unjustified chokeholds and that he feared that any
future contact with the Los Angeles police could "result in his being
choked and strangled to death without provocation, justification or
other legal excuse."3 66
The Court concluded that Lyons lacked standing to press his
claim for injunctive relief because the threat of future injury was too
abstract and conjectural. 367 The past unlawful use of the chokehold
against Lyons was not enough to show that he was at risk of direct,
immediate harm. 36 8 Rather, to sustain a claim for injunctive relief,
Lyons had to allege (implausibly) that not only would he encounter the
police again but that either "all police officers in Los Angeles always
choke any citizen with whom they happen[ed] to have an encounter"
or "that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such
manner."36 9 As framed by the Court, Lyons had an imminence
problem. He had failed to demonstrate substantial certainty that he
would have to endure another Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") chokehold.
Still, ample evidence in the record suggested that the LAPD
chokehold did actually threaten ongoing harm to City residents and
that an injunction would have more than a theoretical benefit. For
example, the district court's findings indicated that the city authorized
its police officers to use "life-threatening chokeholds to [sic] citizens
who pose[d] no threat of violence." 70 Further evidence suggested that

364. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98.
365. Id. at 97. They applied such pressure that they damaged his larynx. Id. at 98. He
blacked out. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). When he regained consciousness, he was lying
face down and spitting up blood and dirt. Id. at 115. He had urinated and defecated. Id.
366. Id. at 98 (majority opinion).
367. Id. at 105; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (dismissing charges of
racial discrimination in bail and sentencing as being too speculative).
368. 461 U.S. at 105.
369. Id. at 105-06.
370. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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it had been the city's official policy for years to allow their use3 7 ' and
that training guidelines permitted officers to rely on them to subdue
suspects. 372 In the period before and after Lyons's injury, the LAPD
applied chokeholds at least 975 times. 373 At least sixteen persons had
died as result of chokeholds used by LAPD officers, a disproportionate
number of whom (twelve) had been black males. 37 4 As a matter of

standing, therefore, the Court should have had a more than sufficient
factual basis to conclude that an injunction against the LAPD would
reduce the chance that Adolph Lyons would be subjected to a
chokehold in the future.
The Court also had another avenue available to it. Similar to
Powell's strategic turn in Bakke, the Lyons Court could have framed
Adolph Lyons's injury in terms of an increased likelihood that he
would be subjected to the chokehold again, just as the diminished
opportunity to be admitted to UC Davis Medical School was sufficient
injury for standing purposes in Bakke.3 75 From this perspective, the
continued use of the chokehold was causally related to Lyons's ongoing
injury. An order enjoining its use would satisfy redressability because
it would reduce the chance that Lyons would be subjected to the
chokehold again. A few years before, the Court had applied this same
concept to Allan Bakke,3 7 6 but it refused to apply it to Adolph Lyons.
Its failure to conclude as much illustrates the asymmetry of innocence
in standing in ways that privilege white litigants. Adolph Lyons
apparently had neither resisted nor provoked the police. 377 Thus, he
too was "innocent," and yet the Court refused to find that he had
standing to pursue his claim.3 7 8

Allen v. Wright provides another example of the racially
disparate rules of standing. In Allen, the Court addressed whether
parents of black children who attended public schools undergoing
desegregation could enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from

371. Id. at 116.
372. Id. at 118-19.
373. Id. at 116.
374. Id. at 115-16.
375. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1310
(2013) (critiquing, as to Lyons, "[tihe notion that standing requires absolute certainty" as being
"entirely at odds with ... most understandings of standing doctrine"); Christina B. Whitman, An
Essay on Texas v. Lesage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 621, 630 (2000) (observing that a "broader
definition of the injury" in affirmative action cases allowed plaintiff to avoid the "causal problem"
in Lyons).
376. See supra Part III.A.
377. 461 U.S. at 97.
378. Id. at 111-12.
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providing tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 379
Plaintiffs alleged that the federal government undermined the
integration of local public schools by giving tax exempt status to allwhite private schools in their communities. 380 This problem
manifested most starkly in the South, where many public schools were
operating under court orders to integrate in the face of significant
public resistance.38 1 The opening of these private schools was not
coincidental but rather was timed to give white students who did not
want to attend desegregated public schools the option of attending a
segregated private school instead. 382 Indeed, the Allen litigation began
with efforts by black parents in Mississippi to limit white flight from
integrated public schools to segregated private schools. 383
The Allen plaintiffs claimed two types of harm. They alleged
that they had been "harmed directly by the mere fact of Government
financial aid to discriminatory private schools" 384 and that the private
schools' tax exempt status diminished their children's opportunity to
attend local public schools that were racially integrated.38 5
The Court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing. 386 As
usual, its interpretation of plaintiffs' injury was pivotal because, as
already noted,387 the Court's standing analysis flows from the defined
harm. Plaintiffs were required to allege "personal injury" that was
"fairly traceable to the defendant's purportedly unlawful conduct" and
that such injury was "likely to be redressed by the requested relief." 3 88
Standing, therefore, would be denied if the relationship between the
injury and the defendants' actions was too attenuated or if the
requested relief would not clearly remedy the harm. 389 Thus, plaintiffs'
ability to satisfy the causation and redressability requirements hinged
on how the Court conceptualized the injury.

379. 468 U.S. 737, 743-45 (1984).
380. Id. at 745, 752.
381. See generally Gabriel Chin, Jim Crow's Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107, 11121 (2004) (detailing efforts in a number of southern states to avoid integration).
382. Allen, 468 U.S. at 737, 743-44; see also Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970)
(describing vast numbers of private schools that were established in Mississippi to avoid public
school integration); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D.D.C. 1970) (discussing the
opening of private, segregated schools "in districts where desegregation was imminent").
383. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing history of
litigation).
384. Id. at 752.
385. Id. at 745, 752-54.
386. Id. at 753.
387. See supra Part H.A.
388. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
389. Id. at 752.
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As to the first claim, the Court observed that "an asserted right
to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient,
standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court." 390 Nor did
plaintiffs have standing "to litigate their claims based on the
stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination." 39 1 The
problem here was that plaintiffs had disclaimed any interest in
enrolling their children in the tax-exempt private schools. 392 Had their
children applied to these schools and been denied on racial grounds,
the standing issue would have been resolved in their favor. 393 In other
words, only stigma that resulted from being "personally denied equal
treatment" counted as a cognizable harm. 3 9 4 As to the plaintiffs' claim
that their children suffered a diminished opportunity to attend
integrated public schools, the Court acknowledged that such a loss
was "one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system." 3 9 5 But it determined that this harm was not "fairly traceable"
to the IRS's failure to enforce its guidelines because the "line of
causation" was too attenuated between the government's inaction and
the desired integration of plaintiffs' schools. 396 The Court posited that
intervening actions by "third parties" could disrupt school
desegregation, which would compromise the redressability of any
relief. For instance, it was "entirely speculative" whether withdrawing
the tax exemption from a given private school (1) would lead the
school to adjust its discriminatory practices and the parents of
children attending private schools to return to integrating public
schools, and (2) would generate a "large enough" contingent of school
officials and parents to embrace school desegregation in ways that
would make an appreciable difference. 397
The Court's reasoning laid bare a central (and cruel) ironythat a pervasive system of racial discrimination itself precluded
plaintiffs from challenging a pervasive system of racial discrimination.
Indeed, the entire point of the Allen plaintiffs' claim was that the
IRS's failure to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools
bolstered pervasive private opposition to integration mandates. 398 The
notion that private parties would resist integration was hardly
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 746.
See id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 743-45.
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surprising. But plaintiffs' claim was that enhanced IRS enforcement
would at least increase the opportunity for realizing school
integration. 399 Yet the Allen Court required some showing that
reversing the chain of causation would have a positive effect on
plaintiffs' ability to attend racially integrated public schools. 400 This
suggested that the ability to achieve the desired benefit factored into
standing analysis, 40 1 even though the Court had not required Allan
Bakke to demonstrate that he in fact would have been admitted in the
absence of the special program. 402 As we shall see, such certainty has
not been required of other white plaintiffs challenging affirmative
action either. 403 In these later cases, the Court would disclaim a
requirement that the ability to secure the desired benefit was an
element of standing doctrine. 404
The Allen Court's reasoning, as in Warth and Lyons, had all the
hallmarks of the innocence paradigm. It echoed Powell's rejection of
"societal discrimination" as a constitutional basis for affirmative
action in Bakke. 405 Systemic discrimination, regardless of its personal
impact on minorities, was not a harm that the federal courts would
address. 406 Like Bakke, Allen emphasized that the relevant harm was
the individual denial of equal treatment, rather than general racial
subordination that personally affected minorities. 40 7 The required
"directness" of the injury as a practical matter meant that plaintiffs
could not challenge systems that effectuated broad racial
disadvantage unless it was tied to purposeful racial discrimination by
whites against plaintiffs personally. 408 This frame continued Bakke's
trajectory of shifting the Court's normative conception of

399. Cf. id. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Common sense alone would recognize that the
elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to lessen
the impact that those institutions have in defeating efforts to desegregate the public schools.");
see also Nash, supra note 375, at 1292 (noting "increased probability" of white flight resulting
from IRS tax exemption was "hardly valueless"); Stearns, supra note 310, at 368 (observing that
the claim in Allen could just has easily been cast in "opportunity/injury terms, thus justifying
conferring standing there on the logic of Bakke").
400. 468 U.S. at 758.
401. Id. at 759.
402. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (describing
relevant injury as "the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in
the class").
403. See infra Part III.B.2.
404. See infra Part III.B.2.
405. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
406. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-53 (1984).
407. Id. at 755.
408. See Spann, supra note 10, at 1455-58 (discussing other challenges by minority litigants
that were dismissed on standing grounds).

2015]

THE SINS OFINNOCENCE

353

discrimination away from subordinative systems and toward
individualized discriminatory treatment. 409 It erased the pervasive
subjugation of racial minorities from the equal protection narrative
and, as discussed below, reinforced that white victimization by
affirmative action would be the Court's primary focus. This shift not
only transformed equal protection's substantive standards but also its
procedural determinations about the standing of white litigants to
challenge affirmative action.
2. White Plaintiffs
The previous Section discussed the Court's refusal to apply
Bakke's "diminished opportunity" principle to racial minorities in
cases that challenged systems of racial subordination. This Section
explores the expansive conception of racial injury for white litigants
that emerged in the affirmative action case, Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of
Jacksonville.4 10 In Northeastern Florida, an association of mostly
white general contractors sought to enjoin a local law that set aside a
certain percentage of Jacksonville's budget to fund construction work
by minority-owned businesses. 411 The goal of the ordinance was to
enhance minority participation in government contracting.4 1 2
The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff did not have
standing because it failed to demonstrate that any of its members
"would have bid successfully" on any of the contracts allocated to
minority businesses "but for" the set-aside program. 413 This reasoning
sounded like an imminence problem: without a likely future injury,
the association's complaint for prospective injunctive relief was simply
a generalized grievance against the ordinance.4 1 4 Indeed, the court's
ruling was consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in Warth,
Lyons, and Allen, which had dismissed cases brought by minority
litigants on similar grounds.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff need not
show that it would have received the desired benefit "but for" the use

409. See Equality Talk, supra note 28, at 1531-44 (analyzing the impact of Bakke on
affirmative action cases).
410. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
411. Id. at 658.
412. See Brief of Respondents at 1, Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am.
v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (No. 91-1721), 1993 WL 289843, at *1.
413. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 951
F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1992).
414. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 412, at 4.
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of race in a contested policy.415 It determined that the "injury in fact"
in the context of a challenge to a minority set-aside program is the
"inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not
the loss of a contract," 416 an analogue of Bakke's diminished
opportunity to compete. 4 17 A plaintiff who contests a set-aside program
is required only to demonstrate that it is "able and ready to bid on
contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on
an equal basis." 4 1 8 The harm was the imposition of the barrier that
made it harder for some groups than for others to secure the
government benefit. 4 19

But this rationale did not fully address the inconsistency with
the Court's prior decisions. Recall that in Warth the Court rejected a
challenge by minority plaintiffs against an exclusionary zoning
ordinance that prevented low- and moderate-income persons from
residing in the town. 420 The Court concluded that the complaint's
failure to identify a "specific project" that was "currently precluded,"
"delayed," or "thwarted" by the ordinance was fatal to the standing
claim. 421 As in NortheasternFlorida, the Warth plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate the existence of an injury "of sufficient immediacy and
ripeness" to justify their request for prospective injunctive relief. 4 2 2
Finding for the Northeastern Floridaplaintiffs seemed to require that
the Court overrule Warth. But the Court declined to take this
approach. Instead it asserted that Warth was distinguishable on the
grounds that it did not involve a "discriminatory classification" that
purportedly "prevented the plaintiff from competing on an equal
footing in its quest for a benefit." 423

This distinction was perplexing. The Warth plaintiffs had
argued that the town's exclusionary zoning ordinance had effectively
denied them the ability to live in the town. 4 2 4 If anything, they seemed
to have a stronger claimed injury than the Northeastern Florida
plaintiffs who were not prepared to allege any concrete, threatened

415. 508 U.S. at 666-69.
416. Id. at 666.
417. Id. at 665 (describing UC Davis's "decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100
places in the class" as "most closely analogous" to the contractor's injury (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 (1978))).
418. Id. at 666.
419. Id.
420. 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
421. Id. at 516.
422. Id.
423. Ne. Fla., 508 U.S. at 667.
424. 422 U.S. at 496.
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harm, beyond the explicit use of race itself, as a result of the city's
minority set-aside program. But the Court curiously relied on this fact
to bolster its conclusion that the Northeastern Florida plaintiffs had
standing. 425 The Warth complaint, the Court wrote, was "not that they
could not compete equally; it was that they did not win."42 6 This

reasoning was odd to say the least, and the Court admitted that there
was undeniable "tension" between the cases but discounted it as
"minimal."4 2 7 Even if the Warth injury was an "inability to compete for

variances and permits on an equal basis," the Court stated, it was still
distinguishable. 4 2 8 The crucial difference was that the Warth plaintiffs
never alleged that they had in fact applied for a permit or variance for
a "current project," while the Northeastern Floridaassociation alleged
that it bid regularly on the city's contracts and would bid on those that
were "unavailable" as a result of the set-aside. 429 This seemed to be a
non sequitur. A complaint about the inability to compete for a
benefit-even on a regular basis-was plainly a less substantial harm
than an inability to secure the benefit. But the Court treated this
framing of plaintiffs claim as if it was a virtue.
The Court also failed to address another obvious parallel
between Warth and Northeastern Florida. To the extent that the
alleged harm of the exclusionary zoning ordinances in Warth was that
it diminished the plaintiffs' ability to secure housing in the town, it
was hard to discern why the Northeastern Florida plaintiff had
standing but the Warth plaintiffs did not. Notwithstanding the Court's
somewhat strange assertion that the quest for a "win" was
distinguishable from a process injury, there was no real principled
basis to distinguish the two cases, other than that the claimed source
of injury in Northeastern Florida rested on the city's use of racial
classificationS 4 30 and (as in Bakke)431 their presumed harm to the
white plaintiffs. 432

425. See 508 U.S. at 668 ("In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its members regularly bid
on construction contracts in Jacksonville, and that they would have bid on contracts set aside
pursuant to the city's ordinance were they so able.").
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id,
429. Id. at 667-68.
430. Id. at 667.
431. See supra Part I.C.
432. 508 U.S. at 667 ("Unlike the other cases that we have discussed, Warth did not involve
an allegation that some discriminatory classification prevented the plaintiff from competing on
an equal footing in its quest for a benefit.").
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Thus, Northeastern Florida illustrates the expansive
conception of standing for white plaintiffs challenging affirmative
action. In Warth, Lyons, and Allen, each of which involved minority
litigants, the Court had rejected similar interpretations based on the
"speculative" nature of the asserted injury and the plaintiffs'
purported inability to show that they would be threatened with
imminent harm for purposes of prospective injunctive relief. 4 3 3 By
contrast, in Northeastern Florida, the Court concluded that plaintiffs'
failure to demonstrate a concrete future harm was not fatal to their
standing to litigate. The differences between these cases again reveal
the operation of the innocence paradigm: whites who were innocent of
racial wrongdoing were deemed to be presumptively burdened by the
use of racial classifications in affirmative action, even if they could not
demonstrate any likelihood of an actual or threatened injury from the
challenged policy itself. 4 3 4
The Court would apply the lessons of Northeastern Floridain a
future affirmative case, Adarand Constructors v. Pena.435 The
Adarand Court found that white litigants had standing to challenge a
federal program that offered financial incentives to prime contractors
to hire minority subcontractors, 4 3 6 even though the plaintiff had not
shown how the program had affected its loss of the federal contract or
the actual impact that the requested relief would have had on its
future business. 4 3 7 Following its decision in Northeastern Florida, the
Court emphasized that the relevant injury is the "discriminatory
classification [that] prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an
equal footing," rather than the actual inability to obtain the desired
benefit.4 38
NortheasternFloridaand its progeny lend support to the views
of legal scholars that the "expressive" or "stigmatic" harms commonly
associated with racial classifications explain the Court's expansive
interpretations of standing for white litigants.439 The idea is that
racial classifications convey "notions of racial inferiority," and
433. See supra notes 349, 364, and 379 and accompanying text.
434. See supranote 425 and accompanying text.
435. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995).
436. Id. at 210-12.
437. See Brief for the Respondents at 28, Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (No. 93-1841), 1994 WL
694992, at *28-29 ("Petitioner has failed to show that the presumption affected the award of the
subcontract in this case to another bidder, and petitioner has also failed to allege or prove that
the future relief it seeks would affect its business opportunities.").
438. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211 (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)).
439. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 2288-91 (discussing expressive harms
theory).
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"stigmatize" and "demean the dignity and worth of individuals to be
"judged" by their race "instead of by [their] own merit and essential
qualities." 440 Indeed, the Court has pointed to these social "costs"
repeatedly to justify its application of strict scrutiny to express
considerations of race. 441 It is plausible that this is what is driving the
standing problem in affirmative action cases.
The Court frequently justifies strict scrutiny on the grounds
that racial classifications can "lead to a politics of racial hostility." 442
But who precisely is "hostile"? This concern, which is also often cited
by the Court in its substantive treatment of affirmative action cases,
does not fit squarely into the expressive harm theory. The Court never
specifies because it is obvious that the Justices are not referring to the
beneficiaries of affirmative action. With the exception of the remedial
and diversity justifications, innocent whites are presumed to resent
affirmative action policies that do not benefit them. The assumption is
that remedial uses of race incite less hostility because, under these
circumstances, whites are not "innocent" of racial wrongdoing; rather,
race is being used to restore racial minorities to the position they
would have had absent identified intentional discrimination by a
(presumably) white perpetrator. 443 Similarly, diversity justifications
were acceptable to Justice Powell in Bakke 444 and to the Court in
Grutter445 and even in Fisher446 because white applicants could also
benefit from them.
Thus, the innocence paradigm complements and builds upon
the expressive harm theory. It demonstrates that equal protection's
hostility to racial classifications varies according to the perceived
burden on innocent whites. As in the diversity context, equal
protection has been more tolerant of racial classifications that
potentially benefit whites as a group. On the other hand, the Court
infers white resentment and hostility against racial classifications
that are perceived as helping only racial minorities and, therefore,

&

440. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("One of the principal reasons race is treated
as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by
ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226
(quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)); see also Issacharoff
Karlan, supra note 11, at 2288-91 (discussing expressive harms theory).
441. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-27.
442. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
443. See generally Freeman, supra note 34 (discussing antidiscrimination law).
444. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
445. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-25 (2003).
446. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-18 (2013) (embracing Justice
Powell's conception of diversity).
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subordinating whites as a group.44 7 In this context, equal protection
has low tolerance for affirmative action, even where it does not
identifiably injure individual white plaintiffs.
IV. CONTESTING RACIAL INJURY
I have described innocence as the connective tissue between
the substantive rules of equal protection laid down in Powell's opinion
in Bakke, which treated racial classifications as inherently "suspect,"
regardless of whether they were intended for benign or malevolent
purposes, 448 and the apparent presumption of standing in Fisher.449
Section A shifts the conversation to the current confusion over the
outer reaches of racial injury in standing doctrine. Although this
Section focuses on technical questions about the cognizability of racial
harm, we cannot overlook its substantive significance. As discussed in
Section B, the debate about the scope of standing for white plaintiffs
challenging affirmative action is part of a broader struggle over the
very meaning of equal protection, and of equality itself. The cases
discussed below illustrate the. consequences of the innocence paradigm
as it developed in Bakke. But they also reveal new fronts in the
contest to define racial injury and to cabin the reach of the innocence
paradigm.
A. Confusion in the Courts: Texas v. Lesage
As white plaintiffs have pushed to expand the cognizability of
injury in affirmative action cases, courts and legal scholars alike have
reached conflicting conclusions about the cognizability of racial
harm. 450 This conflict is part of an unacknowledged debate about the

447. As Pamela Karlan and others have amply demonstrated, the Court has similarly
expanded standing determinations for white voters to contest "majority-minority" districts,
although these reapportionment claims are analytically distinct from "affirmative action." See
generally Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201,
1202-05 (1996) (describing Court's "misguided and incoherent" attempts "to integrate voting
rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action").
448. 438 U.S. at 291 (describing "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort" as being
"inherently suspect" and, thus, subject to "the most exacting judicial examination").
449. See supra Part II.B.
450. See Whitman, supra note 375, at 632-33 ('The troubling question after Lesage is
whether plaintiffs are also entitled to damages that do not represent the reversal of the
government decision but do compensate for the personal injury (that is, loss of opportunity to be
considered under a fair program) that they suffered."). Compare Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy
and Causation-in-Fact:The Court Still Doesn't Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603, 610 (2000)
(describing Lesage as a liability case), with Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 167 (1st Cir.
2003) (stating Lesage did not address standing "for this type of immediate injunctive relief'),
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reach of the innocence paradigm and how far courts should go in
presuming harm from the mere existence of race-conscious selection
policies. The next section explores these points through the lens of the
Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Lesage 51 and lower court cases
that have interpreted it. Understanding these cases requires some
technical and nuanced attention to the distinctions in standing
doctrine between prospective and retrospective forms of relief as they
relate to the asserted injury in fact. Fisher and other affirmative
action cases appear to have collapsed this distinction and, in so doing,
have silently broadened standing for anti-affirmative action litigants
in ways that have escaped the attention of legal scholars and of courts.
The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Texas v. Lesage
illustrates how hidden assumptions about racial harm influence, and
even subvert, standing determinations. 452 Given evidence (albeit
contested) that race had no tangible impact on the white plaintiff, 453
the Lesage Court's failure even to examine standing as a threshold
issue is perplexing.
Lesage involved a white, African immigrant who applied to a
doctoral program in counseling psychology at the University of Texas
and was rejected. 454 Claiming that he had been denied admission
because of his race, he sued the university for damages and to enjoin it
from further use of race-conscious selection policies in admissions. 455
The university contended that Lesage had been eliminated from the
applicant pool in the early stages of the process, before race was taken
into consideration, and that it would have made the same decision to
deny him even if "racial preferences had not been employed" in the
admissions process. 4 5 6 It produced affidavits from the chair of the
admissions committee that twenty-two "much stronger" candidates,
Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that Lesage "plainly bears on" the standing inquiry), and Ashutosh Bhagwat, Injury
Without Harm: Texas v. Lesage and the Strange World of Article III Injuries, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 445, 451-55 (2001) (analyzing Lesage in standing terms).
451. 528 U.S. 18 (1999).
452. At the time that Lesage was denied admission, the university apparently still
considered race for purposes of diversity, which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later
determined was unconstitutional in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although the Supreme Court would come to a different conclusion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 326 (2003), some years later, by the time the Lesage case emerged, the Court of
Appeals's ruling in Hopwood effectively meant that the University of Texas's graduate
admissions program was also unconstitutional. This likely made it difficult as a practical matter
for the university to defend its program on substantive equal protection grounds.
453. Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 220-22 (5th Cir. 1998).
454. 528 U.S. at 19.
455.

Id.

456. Lesage, 158 F.3d at 219.

360

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2:297

who had also been denied, would have been admitted ahead of Lesage
under a race-neutral system.

4 57

The university submitted evidence

that "[a]t least 80 applicants had higher undergraduate grade point
averages (GPA's [sic]) than Lesage, 152 applicants had higher
Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores, and 73 applicants had
both higher GPA's and higher GRE scores." 458 Given that only twenty
applicants had been offered admission, there was good reason to
believe that Lesage had not been a competitive applicant and that the
university had race-neutral reasons for rejecting him. 45 9
Lesage argued differently. Citing testimony from the chair of
admissions, he asserted that racial considerations had indeed been a
factor at the first stage of the admissions process, when he had been
eliminated from the applicant pool. 460 The admissions committee had
expressed interest in diversifying its student body and in identifying
"qualified people of Hispanic and African American background." 461
Further, the psychology department was "very sensitive to [diversity]
issues and very concerned to get qualified minority students." 462
The district court found for the university on summary
judgment, concluding that there was "no evidence that race was a
factor in the decision to deny Plaintiffs admission to the counseling
psychology program" and thus, the plaintiff had failed to present
sufficient evidence of disparate treatment. 463 The court of appeals,
however, reversed. 464 It concluded that there was a genuine factual
dispute regarding the stage at which race had been a consideration in
the admissions process, which precluded summary judgment. 465
More importantly for our purposes, however, the court of
appeals determined that the university's showing that it would have
made the same decision to reject Lesage, regardless of racial
considerations, was "simply irrelevant." 466 Rather, the crucial question
was whether the university had "violated Lesage's constitutional
rights by rejecting his application in the course of operating a racially

457.
458.
459.
showing
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. at 222.
528 U.S. at 19.
Cf. id. at 21 (concluding that summary judgment was proper given the university's
that Lesage "would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy").
Lesage, 158 F.3d at 220.
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 221-22.
Id.
Id. at 222.
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discriminatory admissions program." 467 Applicants "who had not yet
been eliminated from consideration at the time racially preferential
criteria were applied" had sustained an "implied injury-even if their
applications ultimately would not have resulted in admission under a
nondiscriminatory admissions regime." 468 Echoing Bakke and
Northeastern Florida, the court determined that the injury occurs
when a "discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from
competing on an equal footing." 469 But the court treated this as a
matter of liability, not standing. 470 The only matter that was left to be
decided was the extent of the remedy or damages award.4 7
Before turning to the Supreme Court's opinion, we have to
explore the crucial differences between how the district court and the
court of appeals conceptualized Lesage's injury. For the district court,
Lesage's harm was his rejection from the graduate counseling
program, which it determined was not causally related to the
university's consideration of race. 4 72 The question of when race was
considered-either during a phase when Lesage was still in the
applicant pool or after he was eliminated-was immaterial for the
district court because, in the end, race had not been a dispositive
factor.47 3 The court of appeals saw it differently: the harm was the
diminished opportunity to compete for a slot in the incoming class,
which was as appropriate for a damages claim as it was for
prospective injunctive relief.4 74
The implications of the court of appeals's interpretive shift are
important, as it conflated what has been an important distinction in
standing doctrine between backward- and forward-looking claims for

467. Id.
468. Id. (emphasis added).
469. Id. at 222 (quoting Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995)).
470. Id.; cf. id. at 221 ("If race was considered before Lesage's application was rejected,
Lesage has standing to challenge the admissions policy because his application may have been
affected by the use of racial preferences.").
471. Id. at 222:
Thus, even though the district court may have correctly predicted that Lesage
suffered no direct injury and therefore incurred no compensatory damages, this
scenario does not foreclose the availability of some other relief to which he may be
entitled. The futility of Lesage's application was, therefore, an improper grounds for
summary judgment.
472. See id. at 220-21 (citing district court's conclusion that it could "find[] no evidence that
race was a factor in the decision to deny Plaintiffs admission to the counseling psychology
program").
473. See id.
474. See also id. at 222 (observing that "the possibility that ... Lesage [] would not have
been offered admission is relevant only to the quantum of damages available-not to the pure
question of the state's liability, which is the issue on summary judgment").
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relief. Under conventional standing rules, the nature of the asserted
injury determines whether the plaintiff is eligible for her claimed
relief.4 7 5 If she claims past harm, she is entitled to retrospective relief
in the form of damages. 476 If her asserted injury is prospective, then
she may seek future-oriented relief such as an injunction prohibiting
defendants from future considerations of race. 477 By concluding that
the relevant injury was Lesage's inability to "compet[e] on an equal
footing," 4 78 the court of appeals imported the future-oriented concept

from Bakke and Northeastern Florida and applied it to a backwardlooking claim for retrospective relief. 479 Because of this move, the court
was able to treat the consideration of race during a part of the
admissions process in which Lesage was evaluated as an "implied
injury," 480 regardless of its actual impact on the admissions
outcome. 481
The Supreme Court reversed in a cursory per curiam
opinion. 482 It determined that the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the university was not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's
damages claim based on its undisputed "same decision" showing that
he "would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy." 4 83 The

Court's opinion actually focused on Lesage's claim for damages, 48 4 but
because it was unclear whether he had abandoned his request for
prospective injunctive relief, the Court remanded for further
proceedings. 485 In so doing, it noted that a plaintiff who challenged an
475. See supra Part II.A (citing cases).
476. See supra Part II.A.
477. See supra Part II.A.
478. 158 F.3d at 222 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995)).
479. Id. (observing that the "relevant" question was the "quantum of damages available").
480. Id.
481. The court of appeals also hinted at another theory: that his rejection under an
admissions policy that was effectively unconstitutional, following its decision in Hopwood, was a
cognizable harm. See id. (suggesting that "the state violated Lesage's constitutional rights by
rejecting his application in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions
program").
482. Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 22 (1999).
483. Id. at 20. The Court concluded that the court of appeals's opinion was inconsistent with
the liability framework set forth in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977). Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20. Mt. Healthy was a First Amendment case, 429 U.S.
at 276, but the Court determined that the same principles applied under equal protection. 528
U.S. at 20-21. The Lesage Court declared that "government can avoid liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive." 528 U.S. at 21. Under
Mt. Healthy, "even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a
decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it
would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration." Id. at 20-21.
484. 528 U.S. at 20.
485. Id. at 22.
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"ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need
not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in
question if race were not considered." 486 But then it added, in language
that has confused courts and scholars alike, that the harm was the
"inability to compete on an equal footing."4 87
As discussed below, the lower courts are split on whether this
"inability to compete" language can be read as having eliminated the
distinction between retrospective and prospective forms of racial
injury as a matter of standing. 488 This distinction matters. Recall that
in Northeastern Florida the Court held that a plaintiff seeking
prospective relief need only show that she remains "able and ready" to
compete for the desired benefit, not that she would definitely win it in
the absence of the contested policy.

489

This is because prospective

relief, by its very nature, contemplates the possibility of a future
injury. Therefore, as long as a plaintiff remains "able and ready" 490 to
apply, she should have standing to seek an injunction. In the context
of university admissions, this means that a plaintiff need only show
that she is still eligible for admission.49 1 Evidence of her prior
rejection-even a justified rejection-is not material because her
previous denial of admission has nothing to do (technically speaking)
with her future prospects. 4 92
But a claim for damages against a showing that the plaintiff
would have been rejected regardless of race is quite different. Notably,
neither the question of the plaintiffs standing to seek damages nor
the significance of a same-decision showing was before the Court in
Bakke 493 or in Northeastern Florida.494 But the logic of the "able and

486. Id. at 21.
487. Id. (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
488. See infra Part IV.B.
489. 508 U.S. at 666.
490. Id.
491. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that
Fisher and her coplaintiff at the time lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they had
no intent to reapply to the University of Texas), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
492. See supra Part II.A (discussing distinction between prospective and retrospective
relief).
493. Because the university had conceded standing, it did not pursue the matter. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 (1978). However, likely because the issue had been
raised below, Justice Powell took the opportunity to clarify that the relevant injury was the
inability "to compete for all 100 places in the class." Id. at 280 n.14.
494. In both Bakke and Northeastern Florida-both cases involving claims for prospective
injunctive relief-the Court was asked to decide whether plaintiff had to show that she would in
fact receive the desired benefit in the absence of race, as a condition of satisfying the standing
inquiry. The Court in both cases rejected this as a prerequisite for standing, finding that the
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ready" criterion illustrates why the same-decision showing should
defeat standing in a claim for damages. Once it is known that a
plaintiff would not have been admitted in the absence of racial
considerations, there is no "injury in fact" that is causally related to
the defendant's past consideration of race.
Indeed, this is the critical distinction in Fisher, which involves
a retrospective or backward-looking claim for damages. As noted
above, the University of Texas illustrated that race did not preclude
Abigail Fisher from being "able" to compete on an equal footing
because she would have been denied even if her application had
received some racial consideration. 4 95 Because she has now graduated
from another college, 496 she is no longer eligible for prospective
injunctive relief. 4 9 7 All Fisher has left is a damages claim that involves
an assessment, not of her future prospects under another admissions
cycle, but of the record that existed in 2008 at the time that she was
denied. 498 Assuming the university was correct that she would have
been rejected even if race had factored into her evaluation, she cannot
demonstrate that her rejection to the entering class was caused by
racial considerations. 499 This is a technical question, but its resolution
reveals the extent of the Court's continuing investment in the
innocence paradigm and the rules of adjudication that privilege white
litigants.
B. The Split in the Lower Courts
Lower courts have split on whether Lesage can be read to
suggest that the diminished opportunity principle originally set forth
in Bakke applies only to standing determinations in the context of
claims for prospective, forward-looking relief or whether it should be
applied to backward-looking, damages claims where a defendant has
demonstrated that the outcome would be the same under a race
neutral process. This Section explores two competing approaches by
lower courts in Wooden v. University of Georgia50 0 and Donahue v. City

critical injury for purposes of an ongoing harm was the (future) inability to compete on an equal
footing. Neither case involved an actual same decision showing in the context of retrospective
relief, which would have changed the analysis.
495. See supra Part I.B.
496. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217 n.3.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 217.
499. See supra Part I.B.
500. 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
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of Boston. 0 1 I turn first to Wooden, which broadly interpreted the
plaintiffs injury for standing purposes by conflating the standards for
retrospective and prospective injury. I will then discuss Donahue,
which offers a narrower and more plausible reading of Lesage. I
suggest that, as a doctrinal matter, Donahue represents the best
approach for cabining the reach of the innocence paradigm.
1. Wooden v. University of Georgia
Wooden v. University of Georgia involved an affirmative action
challenge by white plaintiffs who were denied admission to the
University of Georgia and sued for compensatory damages based on
the university's use of race in its undergraduate admissions policy. 502
The university defended in part on standing grounds, arguing that
some of the plaintiffs still would have been denied under a raceneutral system. 503 Wooden is useful for understanding the reach of the
innocence paradigm. It illustrates a court's willingness to presume an
implied racial injury to a white plaintiff simply because his
application was threaded through a process in which race was a factor,
even if race ultimately had nothing to do with his rejection. 504
The University of Georgia's admissions process operated in
three parts.5 05 The first stage evaluated only the applicant's academic
record and involved no consideration of race.5 0 6 Applicants at this
stage received an Academic Index ("AI") score.5 07 They were admitted
if their AI scores were sufficiently high but rejected if their Al scores
fell below a threshold cutoff.5 08 Applicants whose AI score fell into a
middle band were then evaluated at a second stage based on a Total
Student Index ("TSI").50 9 A student's TSI score was calculated based
on a point system that considered a range of factors, including
demographic criteria.5 10 At the TSI stage, students could receive
points for their Georgia residence, gender, and socioeconomic factors,
in addition to race.5 11 Students who self-identified as nonwhite
501. 304 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2002), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, No. Civ. A.00-10884-JLT,
2001 WL 1688904183, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 13, 2001).
502. 247 F.3d at 1264.
503. Id. at 1264, 1281.
504. Id. at 1278-81.
505. Id. at 1266-67.
506. Id. at 1266.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1267.

366

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2:297

received 0.5 points.512 Applicants who achieved a prescribed score at
the TSI stage were admitted; those who fell below a certain minimum
score were denied. 513 The third group of applicants proceeded to
another Edge Read ("ER") stage, where they were reevaluated based
on an individual read of their files by members of the university's
admissions office. Once again, candidates were admitted or rejected
based on their scores. Race was not a factor at this last stage. 514
Craig Green challenged the admissions policy. His Al score fell
within the middle band, which meant that his application was
evaluated at the TSI stage.5 15 As a white applicant, his TSI score did
not include the 0.5 points for race. 5 16 However, he received credit for
other demographic factors based on his parents' educational level, his
gender, and his Georgia residence.5 17 Because his TSI score still was
not high enough for him to be admitted at the second stage or low
enough to be denied, he proceeded to the Edge Read stage where his
individual reviewers gave him the lowest possible score.5 18 At this
point, he was rejected.5 19
There are two critical facts here. The first is that race was only
a factor in the TSI stage. The second, even more important, point is
that the consideration of race at the TSI stage made no difference to
Green's outcome in the admissions process.5 20 Even if he had received
the additional 0.5 point for race, his score still would not have been
high enough for admission; he would have proceeded to the final stage
where his application was ultimately rejected based on race-neutral
criteria. 521

512. Id. at 1266-67.
513. Id. at 1267.
514. Id. at 1278-79 ("It is also established, on this record, that race was a factor only at the
TSI stage, and was not an express consideration at . . . the final ER stage."). But see id. at 1279
n.15 (noting that Green maintained that race was an "unstated" factor at the final stage and
concluding that "[b]ecause we find that Green has standing regardless of whether race was
considered . . . during the ER stage, we do not resolve that debate, and leave the issue
for .. . remand.").
515. Id. at 1266.
516. Id. at 1267.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.:
If Green had designated himself as non-white, his TSI score would have been 4.390.5 points higher than it was, but still just barely below the 4.40 threshold for
automatic admission. Accordingly, Green would have proceeded to the ER stage
regardless of whether he received a 0.5 point credit due to his race.
521. Id.
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The question then was whether Green had standing to contest
the university's policy. Both the district court on remand and the
Eleventh Circuit in the subsequent appeal evaluated the standing
question under Lesage, but they differed in their analysis of the
diminished opportunity principle. The district court found that Green
lacked standing to sue because race made no difference either to his
rejection or to his treatment in the admissions process itself.5 22
Further, his TSI score, which had been calculated at a race-conscious
stage of admissions, did not carry over to the Edge Read stage, where
his application was denied. 523 The district court rejected Green's
argument that he had standing simply from having been subjected to
a race-conscious admissions process. 524 Green could not show that the
system had diminished his opportunity to "compet[e] on an equal
footing" because he had not "shown that he was otherwise qualified"
for admission and that his application was "tainted" by the
consideration of race in the process. 525
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Green had
standing. 526 It acknowledged the difficulty of the question but
ultimately determined that the district court had construed Green's
injury too narrowly. Although Lesage did not specifically address
standing, the appeals court observed that the Supreme Court decision
had clarified the standing requirements for affirmative action
plaintiffS 5 2 7 by "defin[ing] the kind of injury that would support

relief." 528 It was persuaded that under Lesage the "relevant injury" in
all circumstances was the denial of an opportunity to compete on an
equal footing.5 29 Accordingly, Green had been injured because his
application had been "denied equal treatment at the TSI stage" where
he did not receive the 0.5 "bonus" offered to minority candidates. 530
The bonus had no bearing ultimately on Green's rejection, but the
court dismissed this fact as irrelevant. 531 It asserted that focusing on
the outcome conflated the merits determination with the standing
522. See Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268
*10-12 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2000)
523. Wooden v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1279-80 (11th Cir.
2001).
524. Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *11.
525. Id. at *10.
526. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1289.
527. Id. at 1277 (quoting Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 208 F.3d 1313,
1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000)).
528. Id.
529. Id. at 1280.
530. Id. at 1279.
531. Id.
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inquiry.5 3 2 What mattered was that Green had "not [been] allowed to
compete on an equal footing with non-white candidates at the TSI
stage." 5 33 This was consistent with the Supreme Court's standing
jurisprudence, which had turned away from a "result-oriented,"toward
a "process-oriented,"analysis. 534 Green's simple "exposure" to unequal
treatment was, therefore, sufficient. 53 5

The court of appeals accurately described the language in
Lesage regarding "the relevant injury." But it overlooked two critical
distinctions. First, the court failed to appreciate that the cases cited by
the Supreme Court in support of its declaration each involved
allegations of future injury to a policy that would continue to apply to
the plaintiff.536 Second, the court of appeals did not take into account
the context of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the "relevant injury"
language in Lesage, which was to rebut an argument by defendants
that plaintiffs were required to show, as a condition of satisfying

standing for purposes of injunctive relief, that it would win the desired
benefit in the absence of race.5 37 In other words, the Supreme Court

had not distinguished the application of the diminished opportunity
doctrine to claims for prospective, versus retrospective, relief, because
it was not confronted with that issue. 538 Had the court of appeals in
Wooden focused on these distinguishing features, it might have agreed
with the district court that Green lacked standing.
2. Donahue v. City of Boston

This Section discusses Donahue v. City of Boston, which offers
a more plausible reading of racial injury under current standing
doctrine and thus avoids expanding the innocence paradigm beyond
its current reach. 53

532. Id. at 1281.
533. Id. at 1279.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Indeed, the court of appeals's opinion itself cited Northeastern Floridaand Adarand, id.
at 1280, both of which were focused on prospective relief. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (observing that in order for plaintiff "to maintain its claim for forwardlooking relief . . . [it] need not demonstrate that it has been, or will be, the low bidder on a
Government contract. The injury in cases of this kind is that a 'discriminatory classification
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.' " (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)).
537. Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999).
538. Id.
539. Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Donahue is an employment case, but it offers a useful
alternative interpretation of the same decision analysis under Lesage
and a narrower understanding of racial injury. 540 The case involved a
claim against the city of Boston for its use of race in hiring procedures
for its police force. 541 The city hired from an eligibility list that was
compiled based on the results of a statewide civil service
examination. 542 A consent decree required that the city alternate
minority and white candidates on the list.543 Under its hiring
procedures, the city identified the number of available positions that it
had to fill. 5 4 4 Its personnel office would then certify twice the number
of persons, starting from the top of the list in strict rank order. 54 5 In
addition to the consent decree, one's rank on the list could also be
affected by certain statutory preferences for veterans and their
relatives or for the child of a firefighter or police officer killed in the
line of duty. 546
Donahue was a white candidate who passed the required civil
service examination, but he was never hired during three separate
hiring periods because he ranked too far down the list. 5 4 7 Donahue
sued the city for retroactive appointment as a police officer, along with
damages associated with his lost employment. 548 He also sued to
enjoin the city from using race in future hiring processes that would
involve him.549

On a motion for summary judgment, the district court
concluded that Donahue lacked standing.5 50 As required by the
consent decree, the city had alternated minority and white names on
the list.551 But, critically, the presence of the minority candidates on
the list had no impact on Donahue. The district court found that even
if the minority candidates had been removed, Donahue still would
have been ranked too low to have been hired based on the number of

540.
541.
Dec. 13,
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
Dec. 13,
551.

Id.
Donahue v. City of Boston, No. Civ.A.00-10884-JLT, 2001 WL 1688904, at *1 (D. Mass.
2001).
304 F.3d at 112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 119-21.
Donahue v. City of Boston, No. Civ.A.00-10884-JLT, 2001 WL 1688904, at *6 (D. Mass.
2001).
See 304 F.3d at 113-14.
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available positions.552 In fact, his ranking was so low that he appeared
to have had no reasonable chance of being hired even without the
requirements of the consent decree. 553 Relying on Lesage, the district
court, therefore, concluded that Donahue lacked standing for all
purposes. However, like the court of appeals in Wooden, it failed to
distinguish between Donahue's claims for damages and prospective
relief. 6
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment as
to Donahue's claim for damages but determined that fact questions
precluded the grant of summary judgment on his claim for prospective
injunctive relief. Significantly, the court of appeals stated that it
"perceive[d] crucial analytical differences between the two claims."5 5 5
His request for damages was "doomed to fail" because he plainly had
been situated "too far down the list to be even remotely considered for
hiring in any of the three instances of which he complains."5 56 This
interpretation of standing was sensible. Its thrust was that plaintiffs
do not suffer a racial injury simply because race is part of a general
decisionmaking process. Rather, standing exists only if racial
considerations caused the plaintiff himself to be rejected. The court,
therefore, rejected the notion that the mere presence of race under an
affirmative action policy is enough to confer injury on a white
plaintiff.557
On the other hand, prospective relief had to be "viewed through
a different prism,"5 5 8 given fact questions about how race had been

used during one of the hiring cycles and how it might be factored into
a future process.55 9 The court's analysis of Lesage is instructive. Like
the court of appeals in Wooden, it also determined that Lesage was
relevant to standing analysis.56 0 But it differed from the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion that the "relevant injury" in all circumstances was
the inability to compete on an equal footing. Rather, it interpreted the
Supreme Court's opinion in Lesage to provide a "clear cue" that
standing analysis differs based on the nature of the relief-

552. 2001 WL 1688904, at *5.
553. Id. For example, the court found that the city "would have had to consider 586
applicants ahead of Donahue for thirteen spots," independent of the consent decree. Id.
554. 304 F.3d at 116.
555. Id.; see also Aiken v. Hackett, 281 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between
retrospective and prospective claims).
556. 304 F.3d at 117.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 119.
559. Id. at 119-20.
560. Id. at 117-18.
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retrospective versus prospective-and that the equal footing doctrine
applies only to the latter.5 6 ' Again, the important difference here lies
in the forward-looking nature of the asserted injury. Under
Northeastern Florida, an ongoing race-conscious program could
plausibly cause a white plaintiff to "lose" an opportunity to compete
with a minority candidate.562 Therefore, a plaintiff seeking prospective
relief need not show that she would necessarily win the desired benefit
for purposes of standing. The harm again is the diminished
opportunity to compete. 563 A claim for damages, however, is different.
There the plaintiff should be required to show that racial
considerations contributed to her loss. In the absence of such a
showing, it follows under current standing rules that a plaintiff should
not have standing when she cannot show that she was in fact injured
by the contested policy. 5 6 4

By rejecting the notion that the mere presence of race in a
contested government process necessarily confers an injury on
otherwise unsuccessful applicants, Donahue more narrowly interprets
racial injury than Wooden. Unlike Wooden, it usefully avoids
expanding the reach of the innocence premise. 565 Once again, the
resolution of this question shows how far courts will go to push the
outer boundaries of standing doctrine to accommodate the interests of
litigants who challenge race-conscious selection policies.
The innocence paradigm has continued to manifest itself in a
variety of other challenges to affirmative action. In these cases, courts
have determined either that white plaintiffs have standing or have
overlooked standing entirely despite evidence that they would have
been denied under a race-neutral selection system. In Farmer v.
Ramsay, for example, a district court concluded that the University of
Maryland School of Medicine's consideration of race had not caused
plaintiffs denial of admission but neglected the threshold question of
whether he had standing to sue.5 66 In Price v. City of Charlotte, the

court determined that white plaintiffs had standing to seek
compensatory damages based on the consideration of race in the city's

561. Id. at 118.
562. See supra Part III.B.2.
563. Supra Part III.B.2.
564. See supra PartH.A.
565. See also Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 166-67 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying Lesage
to defeat standing for purposes of damages but concluding that plaintiffs had standing to seek
injunctive relief).
566. See 159 F. Supp. 2d 873, 888 (D. Md. 2001).
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promotion process even though race was not a factor in its decision.5 67
In Hopwood v. Texas, Cheryl Hopwood sued the University of Texas
School of Law for considering race in admissions in order to remedy
past discrimination in the state's system of primary and secondary
education and to promote a more racially diverse campus.56 8 Following
a court of appeals ruling that declared the policy unconstitutional and
enjoined the university from considering race in admissions,5 6 9 the
district court determined that Cheryl Hopwood would not have been
accepted under a race-neutral system.57 0 Because the case was decided
on liability grounds and not on the basis of standing, the injunction
against the university remained.5 7 ' As with the other cases discussed
in this Part, Hopwood illustrates the reach of the innocence paradigm
and the willingness of some courts to infer racial injury simply
because a white plaintiff was subjected to a race-conscious selection
process, even if race ultimately had nothing to do with her rejection.
The expansive interpretations of standing for white litigants in
Hopwood and the other cases discussed in this Section leave the
judiciary vulnerable to the impression that it is racially partial-that
it bends over backwards for white plaintiffs challenging race-conscious
selection policies but holds minority litigants to a higher standard.
This selective interpretation of standing allows white litigants
challenging affirmative action to proceed with their claims despite the
lack of any demonstrable injury, for reasons that appear to be acutely
race-conscious and designed to protect whites as a group.

567. See 93 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing that
anyone who deprives another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" based on "any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia" shall be liable to the injured party).
568. See 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
569. See id. at 962 (holding "that the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as
a factor in deciding which applicants to admit").
570. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 894-900 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that the
Hopwood plaintiffs were not academically competitive and were "among over 3,500 individuals,
including approximately 1,500 Texas residents, who were denied admission"), aff'd in relevant
part, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000) ("We conclude that the district court's ultimate finding
that the Plaintiffs would have had no reasonable chance of being admitted to the Law School
under a race-blind admission system was not merely free of reversible error but was eminently
correct.").
571. See id. at 901-02 ("To the extent the Fifth Circuit concludes the plaintiffs were denied
admission as a result of the law school's unconstitutional admissions procedures, an
injunction. .. would be the most appropriate and equitable remedy the Court could fashion.").
The Fifth Circuit later reversed the district court's permanent injunction against any
consideration of race by the university. See Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 276-77.
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C. Standing as a Product and Agent of Inequality
The previous Section discussed cases that threaten to expand
standing doctrine on behalf of reverse discrimination litigants, beyond
the already very broad interpretations sanctioned by the Court in
Bakke and subsequent cases. 572 The Court's apparent disregard of the
57 3 is another example of the
standing question most recently in Fisher
innocence paradigm at work. This paradigm tracks the underlying
"colorblindness" rationale that has come to define equal protection.5 7 4
Under this rationale, racial classifications are presumptively harmful
(and presumptively unconstitutional), even if they are being
instrumentally used, as was the case in the era of Bakke, to improve
opportunities for disadvantaged racial minority groups,5 76 and even if,
as now in Fisher, these classifications are part of racially inclusive
programs that promote student diversity.57 6
Bakke and its progeny suggest that standing doctrine is
inversely related to equal protection: it broadens as the equal
protection guarantee narrows;57 7 therefore, it is both a product and
agent of racial inequality. Like equal protection, standing doctrine
ratifies racial hierarchy and inequality5 7 8 by legitimizing white
grievances that affirmative action is harmful unto itself. The failure of
the Supreme Court even to address standing in Lesage67 9 or Fisher,8 0
given evidence that race made no difference to the rejection of white
plaintiffs in those cases, is troubling. It indicates that innocence is so
baked into equal protection's operating system that courts do not take
the apparent lack of injury seriously enough to address it as a
jurisdictional problem.

572. See supraPart III.
573. See supraPart II.B.
574. See supra Part II.C.
575. See generally Equality Talk, supra note 28, at 1475 (exploring the ways in which the
Constitution can be interpreted to mandate intervention on behalf of a disadvantaged social
group).
576. See supra Part I.B.
577. See Equality Talk, supra note 28, at 1531-32 ("[Justice Powell's Bakke] opinion
protected whites by . . . charging federal judges with responsibility for protecting whites from
race discrimination in the political process, a role judges had previously played only for racial
minorities.")
578. See Siegel, supra note 242, at 82. See generally Freeman, supra note 34 (arguing that
Supreme Court decisions of the last twenty-five years have highlighted a dissonance between
normative antidiscrimination laws and a persistent and dominant social inequity).
579. See supra Part W.A.1.
580. See supra Part II.B.
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In his influential58' article "The Structure of Standing,"
William Fletcher contended that standing determinations reflect
judgments about the meaning of the underlying substantive right. 582
Fletcher's point that substantive law is integrally tied to procedural
determinations about who has standing to sue is consistent with this
Article's thesis: the embrace of racial innocence in equal protection led
to a parallel framework in standing doctrine, which appears to
presume that white litigants have suffered racial injury from the raceconscious selection policies they oppose. 583
Fletcher proposed to resolve the inconsistencies in standing by
eliminating standing as a jurisdictional requirement.584 Under his
proposed framework, courts would look to the equal protection clause
to define the universe of litigants eligible to sue.5 85 In the context of
challenges to affirmative action, the standing inquiry presumably
would be satisfied as long as the plaintiff has alleged a denial of equal
protection by the state because of race.5 86 According to Fletcher, a

581. A generation of legal scholars have come to embrace Fletcher's understanding of
standing doctrine. See, e.g., Young, supra note 67, at 498-99.
582. See Fletcher, supra note 36, at 265-76.
583. See supra Parts II.C, III.A.
584. See Fletcher, supra note 36, at 223 (arguing that standing should rest solely on the
merits of a plaintiffs claim instead of preliminary jurisdictional requirements).
585. See id. at 243 ("The question is whether, under the statutory or constitutional provision
at issue, the particular provision should be read to protect against the injury asserted by the
kind of person who is seeking to bring suit.").
586. Fletcher's proposal (and the standing problems I have identified here) dovetail with
longstanding normative debates about the proper boundaries of standing itself. I do not resolve
these broader questions but only touch on them briefly here. Legal scholars, for example,
disagree about whether standing should follow a "private -rights" model of adjudication that
focuses on dispute resolution between private parties or whether it should instead track a
"public" litigation model as a vehicle for "articulating and enforcing legal norms." See Stearns,
supra note 310, at 353 ("The central dispute that I believe continues to pervade the standing
literature . . . is whether standing is best understood as furthering a 'private-rights' or 'public
rights' model of judicial decisionmaking."); see also Siegel, supra note 10, at 77-78 ("The private
rights view of the federal courts competes with the 'public rights' or 'special function' view, which
regards articulating and enforcing legal norms, and policing the other branches of
government. . . as primary roles of the courts."); id. at 78 (observing that "the battle" between
these two views "serves as a proxy for a larger debate over the judicial role in our society").
Requiring injury-in-fact-as I have suggested here-is conventionally more consistent with the
private rights adjudicatory paradigm. See Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1447-48 (observing that
the "injury-in-fact requirement" has been "criticized as a holdover from private-law ideas"); see
also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141,
1165-69 (1993) (suggesting that private model of standing arose to curb "public law" litigation
and "sought the vindication of constitutional or statutory interests"). As described by Maxwell
Stearns, the distinction between the private- and public-rights models turns on the purpose of
the litigation: The private model is defined by "efforts to win suits even if the result is to make
law," while under the public model the goal is "to make law even if doing so requires devising a
suit." Stearns, supra note 310, at 369.
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defendant could not legitimately object to standing on the grounds
that the plaintiff "who is otherwise entitled to enforce the clause
wants something beyond that which is provided directly by the clause,
or that enforcement of the clause is unlikely to provide it in her
particular case."58 7 In this respect, his proposal would address one of

the problems of the innocence paradigm that I have identified:
lowering the standing bar for everyone would necessarily align the
standing rules that apply to white and minority litigants alike.
Fletcher's proposal has appeal, but it is not well-suited to
disputes over affirmative action, which implicate socially charged
matters of race that reverberate well beyond the courts. His proposal
in this context invites more problems than it solves. All litigants could
more easily access the federal courts, but because the innocence
paradigm remains deeply embedded in equal protection, minority
litigants challenging systemic racial subordination would have more
difficulty maintaining a cause of action once they were in the door.5 88

White reverse discrimination litigants, on the other hand, could more
readily proceed under equal protection's "colorblindness" regime,
which regards race-conscious selection policies as presumptively
unconstitutional.5 89
Thus, if the inability to find plaintiffs who are tangibly harmed
by affirmative action is any guide,5 90 then a lower standing bar simply
provides a forum both inside and outside the courts for unsuccessful
applicants to propagate a narrative of white victimization. 5 9 ' This
narrative has its own social costs. Providing a forum for aggrieved
applicants ratifies the assumption that whites are inherently harmed
by affirmative action; 592 accordingly, it is problematic as a matter of
principle. But allowing such litigation to proceed also misrepresents
the equality "costs" of affirmative action to the courts and to a broader
587. Fletcher, supra note 36, at 242.
588. See infra Part II.C. (discussing Bakke's application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious
selection policies).
589. See infra Part II.C.
590. See Biskupic, supra note 44 (observing difficulty that Fisher's patron, Ed Blum, had
finding plaintiffs and noting that Fisher was the daughter of a personal friend); see also
Bhagwat, supra note 450, at 449:
[I]n the leading cases challenging [affirmative action programs and race-conscious
selection policies], the plaintiff is typically unable to prove that he or she would have
received the benefits being dispensed by the challenged program if the government
had not considered race, and thus has been unable to prove that the use of race in
these programs actually deprived the plaintiff of some tangible benefit.
591. Cf. Mazie, supra note 216 (highlighting the frustrations of one Pennsylvania student
who broadcasted her outrage to the Wall Street Journal and the Today Show).
592. See id. ("[Tihe actual impact of ending affirmative action on white candidates' chances
of admission to Harvard would be virtually nil, and well under a one-percent boost.").
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public5 93 that is often quick to blame a white applicant's lack of
success on racial "preferences."5 9 For example, in the effort to assert
global white injury for purposes of standing, Fisher's complaint
glosses over both the competitiveness of the University of Texas's
admissions policy and how the policy actually works.59 5 The policy's
modesty-both in terms of its highly calibrated and nuanced
consideration of race and its limited impact on white applicants-not
only got lost in the case 5 9 6 but was also largely overlooked in the public
conversation that emerged around it.597
Relaxing the rules of standing as Fletcher has suggested
creates opportunities to further distort our already highly charged
conversations about race and racial equality.59 8 The result is a racial
gulf between the perceived and actual costs of race-conscious selection
policies, which corrupts the public calculus about whether the benefits
of racial inclusion are worth the impact they might have on
individually displaced white applicants. 9 9 Dispensing with the injury
requirement gives the claims of uninjured plaintiffs the patina of
constitutional legitimacy and injects them into our public
conversation, at the potential cost of binding court decisions striking
down policies that emerged from a longstanding historical struggle to
promote racial inclusion. 600 Because standing implicates broader
judgments about the legitimacy of racial harm and about who is and
isn't injured by racially inclusive policies, it also reflects a deeper
struggle over the meaning of equality itself. This struggle originated
in equal protection, but it has spread into standing and now embraces
593. See Gratz, supra note 18.
594. See Mazie, supra note 216. See generally Mahoney, supra note 137, at 813 ("The
rhetoric that poses 'preferences' against 'merit' helps to affirm merit as an attribute of
whiteness.").
595. See supra Part II.B.
596. See Mahoney, supra note 137, at 803 (discussing affirmative action's perceived threat to
whites even where it has limited impact).
597. See, e.g., Gratz, supra note 18 (discussing broadly the Fisher case, but failing to detail
the particulars of the university's admissions policy); cf. Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Abigail
Fisher's Case Against Affirmative Action Is Really About, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/abigail-fisher-case-affirmative19, 2013, 2:21 PM),
action n_2901888.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NF6P-MTRA (noting that it is likely Fisher
would have been denied admission even if she had received "points for her race").
598. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 597 (noting how Fisher's case has the potential to
change public discourse and the legal system, despite plaintiffs admission that she sought "a
grand total of $100 in damages").
599. Cf. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 2276-77 (describing the "escalating spiral"
of voting rights litigation as a result of the Court's expansive definition of the standing of white
voters to challenge the consideration of race in reapportionment and calling for a "limiting
principle on court involvement").
600. See Equality Talk, supranote 28.
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the costly narrative that enhancing opportunity for people of color is a
zero-sum game that is by definition harmful to whites.
D. A Modest Proposal:Returning to Fisher
This Section stakes out a modest approach to Fisher: it calls,
quite simply, for litigants challenging affirmative action to show that
they have sustained a tangible, personal harm as a result of a raceconscious selection policy. Plaintiffs would have standing where race
is determined to be a contributing factor to the denial of the desired
benefit. Injury would not be presumed because of an underlying
grievance with affirmative action itself. The mere use of racial
classifications in a selection policy, in other words, would not be
sufficient alone to establish standing.
This proposal tracks the court of appeals's approach in
Donahue. There, the court determined that the relevant constitutional
harm in affirmative action cases is the rejection itself, not an implied
racial injury that stems from the very consideration of race.60 1 For
damages claims, a defendant could defeat plaintiffs standing if it
could show that racial considerations did not in fact cause the
plaintiffs rejection. The plaintiffs simple resentment or personal
offense would not be enough to overcome the defendant's samedecision showing. Also, the diminished opportunity principle should
not be applied to retrospective relief where the defendant has shown
that race was not a contributing factor to the plaintiffs rejection. This
argument rests on the inherent differences between prospective and
retrospective relief and also seeks to cabin the destructive reach of the
innocence paradigm upon which the diminished opportunity principle
is based.
How would this proposal apply to Fisher and litigants like her?
To answer this question, first recall where we are. Fisher's pleadings
suggested several different theories of her injury. 602 The first is that
she "likely" would have been admitted into the University of Texas at
Austin "but for" its "use of race-based criteria in its admissions
decisions."6 03 Her second claim is that she was "injured by UT Austin's
use of racial preferences because she was not considered on an equal
basis with African-American and Hispanic applicants who applied for
admission to the same incoming freshman class."6 04 The idea here is

601.
602.
603.
604.

See Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2002).
See Joint Appendix, supra note 110, at 73a-78a ¶¶ 142-64
Id. at 68a-69a T 120 (emphasis added).
Id. at 68a, 75a T¶ 119, 155 (emphasis added).
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that the consideration of race created an uneven playing field that
lowered her chances of admission.6 0 5 As we know from Bakke and
Northeastern Florida, this framing of racial harm has been accepted
by the Supreme Court as a cognizable injury. But there is a critically
important technical distinction. Both of those cases involved
prospective injunctive relief, not retrospective claims for damages. The
"diminished opportunity" injury is consistent with current doctrine as
it focuses on the potential future impact of a continuing affirmative
action policy on a white plaintiff. But it should have no significance for
a plaintiff like Fisher, who has already graduated from college and
thus, under the Court's prior standing decisions, should not be eligible
for injunctive relief.60 6

Finally, and most critically, Fisher claims that the "denial of a
race-neutral evaluation" of her application "alone" was sufficient
injury.6 0 7 This frame is the most troubling because it suggests that
Fisher has standing simply because she was subjected to a raceconscious admissions process, regardless of its actual impact on her
candidacy.6 0 8 Once again, however, it is not clear what a "race-neutral
evaluation" means in the context of admissions at UT Austin. It might
mean that Fisher is arguing for the same "consideration" of race in her
application as minority applicants. But, as already discussed, this is
inconsistent with how race is actually used in the admissions process
because it is not a quantifiable, standalone criterion that necessarily
applies to all candidates.6 0 9

605. In her complaint, Fisher declared that she was "injured by UT Austin's use of racial
preferences because she was not considered on an equal basis with African-American and
Hispanic applicants who applied for admission to the same incoming freshman class." Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 110, at 68a ¶ 119.
606. See supra Part II.A.
607. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22 n.6, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 645
F.Supp.2d 587 (2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS), 2008 WL 7318505; see also Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 92, at 6 (argument of Bert Rein, counsel for Abigail Fisher) ("[T]he denial
of her right to equal treatment is a Constitutional injury in and of itself, and we had claimed
certain damages on that.").
608. Kimberly West-Faulcon refers to this form of manufactured injury as "race blindness
entitlement." See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Forsaking Claims of Merit: The Advance of RaceBlindness Entitlement in Fisher v. Texas, in 29 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES
ANNUAL HANDBOOK 335 (Steven Saltzman ed., 2013).
609. See Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 117, at 11. The
flexible and contextualized use of race also creates some practical problems in identifying who
was "helped" and who was not by racial considerations. Indeed, the district court expressed the
same difficulty-and skepticism-in considering Fisher's earlier request to enjoin the university
from further consideration of race:
Nor is it clear from the record to what extent race was a factor in the admission of
minority students Although race is one of many factors taken into consideration when
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Fisher's effort to reframe her injury as the consideration of race
"alone" in the admissions process reflects the same strategic shift that
Justice Powell made in Bakke. Recall that Powell was able to show
both causation and redressability by broadly defining the injury to
Allan Bakke as the diminished opportunity to compete for all seats in
the incoming class at UC Davis Medical School.610 Similarly in Fisher,
if the consideration of race alone is the relevant harm, then the
University of Texas's policy necessarily "caused" that harm and would,
in turn, be redressed by retrospective relief. Once again, the framing
of the injury is critical to the causation and redressability inquiry. As
in Bakke and NortheasternFlorida, a broad articulation of the injury
makes it easier to satisfy standing, thereby privileging white
plaintiffs.6 11 Such an expansive conception of injury reinforces the
innocence narrative because the mere presence of race is itself enough
to confer injury even if race had no tangible, personal impact on the
plaintiff.
Under my proposal, Fisher (and other litigants like her) would
not have standing. Assuming the university was correct that she
would have been rejected with a "perfect" score in the admissions
process, Fisher cannot claim that she suffered past injury.
Accordingly, she should not be eligible for retrospective relief in the
form of damages. Nor does she qualify for prospective relief, as she has
already graduated from college. Allowing her claim to proceed,
therefore, simply reflects the work of the innocence paradigm and the
presumption of racial injury based on the existence of a race-conscious
affirmative action policy.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the innocence paradigm, its origins in
the rules of equal protection, and its consequential impact on the
procedural realm of standing. The "sins" of innocence lie in its
corrupting influence on our constitutional vision, its power to distract
us from the lived realities of race, and its perpetuation of racial
inequality under the guise of equal protection and standing doctrine. I
have focused on the technical dimensions of this problem, but in so
doing I also mean to make a broader point: our preoccupation with

determining an applicants [sic] PAI score, the Court cannot begin to guess which
minority students actually benefited from this consideration and which did not.
Id. at 4.
610. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978).
611. See supraPart III.A.
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innocence has undermined our collective ability to engage more
thoughtfully in the project of racial equality. By moving beyond
innocence perhaps we can come to embrace affirmative action, not
simply as a burden borne by whites who are "innocent" of individual
wrongdoing, but as a tool for promoting racial inclusion and shared
opportunity.

